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One of the key recurring themes in the Spanish political debate has to do with the fairness of 
the regional distribution of public expenditure and the tax burden. The controversy has been 
particularly intense and bitter in Catalonia, where the growing perception among the 
population that the region has been fiscally mistreated for decades by the Central 
Government has played an important role in the rise of pro-independence sentiment. 
Although with considerable less intensity, the topic is also present in the public debate in 
practically all the other Spanish regions. In each one of them, public opinion tends to focus on 
those aspects of fiscal relations with the Central Administration that are perceived as unfair 
or discriminatory from a local perspective, quite often without a documented basis. To a large 
extent, however, this is the fault of the successive Central Governments because, 
independently of their political sign, they have never made a determined effort to make 
available to the public the information that would be required to undertake a systematic 
analysis of the regional incidence of their tax and expenditure programs—a facet of their 
activities which should not be exempted from the control and scrutiny mechanisms that are 
standard in a democratic country. 
The limited information on the subject that has been available to the public has generally 
come from studies on regional fiscal balances.1 These studies have focused almost exclusively 
on the calculation of the net fiscal balances of the regions or autonomous communities with the 
Central Government, that is, on the difference between the benefits the residents of reach 
region derive from the activities of the Central Administration and their fiscal contribution to 
its financing. This approach suffers, in our view, from a fatal flaw: the net fiscal balance of a 
region is a rather uninformative figure because it is obtained through the indiscriminate 
aggregation of fiscal flows that pursue very different objectives, proceeding in a way that 
almost inevitably leads us to evaluate the activities of the Central Administration in terms of 
a single criterion –its net territorial incidence—whose relevance is highly questionable 
because it has little or nothing to do with the objectives of most public policies.  
The main objective of the present study is to compile, organize and present in as useful a 
form as possible the data required to evaluate the rationality and fairness of the regional 
distribution of taxes and public expenditure. For reasons we have already noted, this requires 
us to go beyond the calculation of regional fiscal balances. What we need is a set of 
regionalized public accounts that will allow us to make valid comparisons across territories 
for the largest possible number of homogeneous tax and expenditure aggregates. Such 
accounts, moreover, have to be organized in a way that will help us identify those budget 
headings that do respond to a regional logic, separating them from those in which territorial 
incidence can be, at most, a secondary consideration, and must allow us to quantify the 
                                                
1 See among many others Castells et al (2000), de la Fuente (2000), Barberán (2006), Uriel and Barberán 
(2007) and IEF (2008). 
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impact of each program or group of them on aggregate fiscal balances, making it possible to 
break up each region’s aggregate balance into a series of components that can be valued 
separately. In the end, these calculations should allow us to decompose regional fiscal 
balances into two parts: one that should not worry us because it is only the result of applying 
uniform tax and benefit rules to populations with different demographic and economic 
characteristics, and a second one that should indeed concern us because it may reflect 
differences in the treatment of similar individuals that would clash with basic notions of 
horizontal equity and with the principle of equality enshrined in our Constitution. 
In this paper we develop a methodology for the construction of such a System of 
Regionalized Public Accounts (SRPA from now on) and illustrate its application with data 
from the year 2005. We have chosen this year because it has already been analyzed in several 
previous studies of regional fiscal balances, a fact that has simplified the data collection 
process and has allowed us to focus more on methodological issues. On the other hand, 2005 
is also sufficiently close as to make us think that our results are still valid at present, at least in 
qualitative terms. Our more recent work for the year 2011 (DBU, 2014b) confirms that it is 
indeed so. 
The paper is divided into two large blocks, complemented by a series of appendices that are 
available on the web (in Spanish) as DBU (2014a). The first block of the paper (sections 2 to 4) 
deals with methodological issues. It describes in detail the structure of the SRPA and the 
basic criteria that have been used to impute public revenues and expenditures to the different 
regions. The second block (sections 5 to 10) summarizes the main results of the analysis and 
section 11 concludes. The Appendices provide a detailed discussion of the regional 
imputation of public revenues and expenditures and of the adjustments we have introduced 
to overcome asymmetries in the distribution of competences across administrations in a way 
that facilitates comparisons across regions. The paper is accompanied by an Excel file with 
the detailed results of the exercise that is available at: http://www.fedea.net/hacienda-
autonomica/ 
 
 2. A System of Regionalized Public Accounts 
As has already been noted in the introduction, the main objective of the regionalized public 
accounts that are constructed in this paper is to facilitate an informed discussion of the 
fairness and rationality of the regional distribution of the burdens and benefits that are 
generated by the Spanish public sector. This goal dictates some key characteristics of the 
design of such accounts. First of all, since we are talking about equity issues, the allocation of 
public revenues and expenditures is undertaken form a burden-benefit perspective. That is, 
the only relevant consideration for the imputation of tax revenues and public expenditures 
across autonomous communities is the place of residence of the citizens in whose benefit 
public policies are designed and undertaken and of the taxpayers who ultimately bear the 
burden of the taxes that finance such policies. From this perspective, the location of the 
administrative units that provide or manage such services or that of the production facilities 
of the enterprises that supply intermediate inputs used in the production of such services is 
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irrelevant. This would not necessarily be true if we were working on the regionalization of 
the National Accounts or if we were interested on the effects of public procurement on 
regional employment, but this is not the case. 
Second, our accounts should not lead us to mix budget items of different nature in terms of 
their relation to the territory in a way that might force us to evaluate them using a logic that is 
foreign to them. It is clear, for instance, that the per capita financing of the different regional 
administrations, or per capita expenditure in police protection in each jurisdiction are 
relevant variables because they determine the level of provision of certain services that is 
enjoyed on average by the residents of different territories. Hence, cross-regional 
comparisons in terms of such variables make sense and are of considerable interest from an 
equity point of view because they may alert us of the existence of differences in the treatment 
of groups of citizens with the same rights and similar needs that would, at the very least, 
require a detailed justification. The same is not true, however, in the case of other variables 
such as military expenditure, unemployment benefits or farm subsidies per capita within 
each region. In these cases, the most reasonable presumption is that differences in per capita 
expenditure across territories simply reflect peculiarities of the relevant services that require 
them to be localized in certain areas or differences in the characteristics of the different 
regions or their populations. None of these things are in principle worrisome from the point 
of view of territorial equity. To avoid mixing different types of spending, the SRPA is 
constructed around a classification of public expenditure that clearly separates what may be 
called properly regionalizable expenditure from other budget items that are allocated –and 
should therefore be evaluated—on the basis of criteria that have nothing to do with the 
territory. 
In order to quantify the contribution of the different revenue and expenditure items to 
aggregate regional fiscal balances, we need to construct such balances in a manner that allows 
an additive decomposition by programs or groups of programs. This is very easy to do when 
we work in relative terms. Instead of asking whether a given region pays more than it 
receives, which only makes sense in the aggregate, we can measure the extent to which each 
territory is above or below the average in per capita terms and multiply the result of this 
calculation by its population in order to arrive at a total relative balance which coincides with 
the (neutralized version of the) standard fiscal balance under certain assumptions regarding 
the imputation of the Central Government’s budget deficit (see section 4 for additional 
details). The great advantage of this procedure is that it can be applied item by item, both on 
the expenditure and on the revenue side, in a way that allows us to calculate partial balances 
that can be used to quantify the impact of each group of programs. It allows us in particular 
to isolate the fiscal deficit or surplus that is generated in each region by those public 
programs that do follow a territorial logic, such as regional financing or infrastructure 
investment, and in which the Central Government does have at least some degree of 
discretional choice. 
Finally, the accounts we want to construct must reflect the peculiar territorial organization of 
the Spanish administration, which is characterized by a high degree of decentralization and 
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autonomy and by a considerable amount of territorial asymmetry in the allocation of 
responsibilities within a given level of the administration. Both of these things complicate the 
analysis.  
If we wanted our accounts to capture all public expenditure, decentralization would raise two 
problems that would be difficult to solve. The first one, purely practical in nature, would 
have to do with the difficulty of gathering the required information, which is spread among 
many different sources and with the heterogeneity of accounting and classification standards 
that exists in such sources, which makes them hard to compare among themselves. The 
second is a conceptual problem: since regional and local administrations enjoy a high degree 
of autonomy and can therefore choose to spend their resources in different ways (or set 
different schedules on devolved taxes), existing differences across regions in terms of the 
volume of expenditure on any given item (or in terms of tax revenues) could be due at least in 
part to the existence of different preferences – a phenomenon which, from our perspective, is 
not problematic. 
A reasonable way to avoid both problems is for our accounts to reflect, not the expenditure of 
regional and local governments, but the resources that are available to them in order to 
provide the services for which they are responsible (before making use of their autonomy to 
raise or lower devolved taxes). From an equity point of view, this is the only variable that 
should concern us because it is the one that determines the overall capacity of each 
administration to provide services to its residents. On practical grounds, moreover, there is 
no realistic alternative to this choice, for collecting and homogenizing detailed data on 
regional and local expenditures would require a truly herculean effort. Hence, we will focus 
only on the revenues of local and regional governments, a choice that leads us to construct 
the SRPA from the point of view of a hypothetical “augmented central administration” that 
would in principle collect all taxes and then channel part of their revenues to regional and 
local administrations, either through direct transfers or through devolved taxes. 
The existence of asymmetries in the allocation of responsibilities within certain administrative 
levels also tends to complicate things because it makes regional financing aggregates and 
certain expenditure items not entirely comparable across regions. The problem is that a given 
service may be managed by the Central, Regional or even Provincial administration 
depending on the territory we are considering, and would therefore appear, in the absence of 
appropriate adjustments, in different sections of our accounts in different parts of Spain. To 
solve this problem, the SRPA introduces a set of adjustments that essentially amount to 
moving certain expenditure items from one place to another in the case of those regions that 
have atypical competences or responsibilities. Although the details will be discussed later on, 
it may be useful to provide a concrete example at this stage. Since Catalonia is the only 
autonomous community that has assumed the management of the prison system, the Central 
Government does not spend any money on this service in the region, but it does transfer to 
the Generalitat (the Catalan regional government) some resources to cover the relevant costs 
that are channeled through the regional financing system. To avoid comparing apples with 
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oranges, in the case of Catalonia it is necessary to take prison transfers out of general regional 
financing and add them to expenditure on public security.  
As has already been noted, the fiscal autonomy of regional and local administrations also 
introduces distortions that tend to complicate revenue comparisons across territories. To 
neutralize this effect, we will generally decompose the yield of regional taxes into two parts: 
one that will approximate the revenues that would have been obtained under a uniform tax 
schedule in the entire country, and a second one that will capture the “supplementary tax 
effort” that each regional administration has decided to ask of its residents. This will allow us 
to construct net fiscal balances, indicators of regional financing and other aggregates of 
interest at “equal fiscal effort.” For obvious reasons, it has not been possible to introduce a 
similar adjustment in the case of the taxes managed by the more than 8.000 local 
administrations that operate in the country. 
  
 2.1. Revenue and expenditure items included in the SRPA and their classification 
The public expenditure and revenue aggregates that are analyzed in the present study are 
summarized in Table 1. Expenditure data generally refer to recognized budget obligations 
and are taken from the Annual Reports on the Results of the General Central Budget (GCB) of 
2005 (IGAE, 2006) and the Social Security Budget of the same year (MTAS, 2007). In general 
we only consider non-financial expenditure, although some large financial operations of 
particular interest are included in an appendix that constitutes section 6 of the expenditure 
side of the SRPA. 
The Annual Report on the GCB provides data on the revenue and expenditure of the 
Ministries and most public organisms of the Central Administration. To these figures we add 
a number of expenditure and revenue items that do not flow through the GCB. These include 
the revenues and expenditures of certain public organisms (such as the Bank of Spain, the 
Securities Commission and other regulatory agencies), the investment in infrastructure of 
certain public enterprises and bodies (such as the airport and port authorities, the railway 
companies RENFE and FEVE, the railway infrastructure authority ADIF and the 
concessionaries of toll highways) and those EU grants that are managed directly by the 
regional administrations. We also include, both on the revenue and on the expenditure side, 
the tax revenues that accrue to regional and local administrations. This item is treated as part 
of the revenue of the Central Government that is then transferred to other administrations 
through the vehicle of devolved taxes. 
To avoid double counting, we subtract from Central Government expenditure the internal 
transfers that take place across its departments and related organisms and enterprises, except 
for those that go to public organisms and enterprises that are not included in the GCB (such 
as the public TV network, the postal system and several transportation firms). Transfers to 
the General Budget of the European Union are also excluded from Central Government 
expenditure. Hence, we are in effect consolidating the EU administration with the Spanish 
public sector because it would be impossible to separate them neatly given that the Spanish 
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administrations execute a large number of expenditure programs that are partially funded by 
EU grants. 
 
Table 1: Fiscal flows that have been included in the SRPA 
___________________________________________________________ 
 • Expenditure: 
= Non-financial expenditure by the Ministries and higher state bodies (the monarchy, 
parliament, etc), its Autonomous Organisms and certain public organisms that are included 
in the GCB(chapters 1 to 7 of the expenditure classification used in the public accounts). 
- internal transfers across administrations, including transfers to the EU budget. 
+ Subsidies to or investments by certain public organisms and enterprises that are not 
included in the GCB. 
+ Expenditure by certain regulatory organisms not included in the GCB (regulatory 
commissions for securities markets, energy and telecommunications and Bank of Spain) 
+ Implicit transfers to regional local administrations through devolved regional taxes and 
local taxes and user charges 
+ EU grants not channeled through the GCB 
+ Consolidated expenditure of the Social Security Systems 
 
 • Revenues: 
= Revenues from direct and indirect taxes and tariffs. It includes revenues from Central 
Government taxes, taxes devolved to the regions and taxes established by the regional 
governments. 
+ social contributions (including those paid by civil servants) 
+ local taxes (IBI, IAE, IVTM, IIVTNU e ICIO)  
+ Other revenues of the Central Administration: user charges and public prices, proceeds 
from the sale of goods and services, transfers from certain public organisms and enterprises 
(e.g. the State Lotteries) and other financial and property income. 
+ Fees charged by certain regulatory organisms (CNMV, CMT and CNE) and revenues of the 
Bank of Spain. 
___________________________________________________________ 
  
On the revenue side, tax revenue data refer to the liquid tax intake, measured on a cash basis, 
because this is the only revenue measure for which we could find the required information 
for all of the variables of interest. Revenue data on Central Government taxes, including the 
component that is devolved to the regional and local administrations, come from the 2003 
and 2005 reports on the regional financing system (MEH, 2005 and 2007a) and from MHAP 
(2012a), which collects information on regional tax revenues that are not included in the GCB. 
Data on social contributions by civil servants and other workers are taken from the Annual 
Reports on the GCB and the General Budget of the Social Security System, IGAE (2006) and 
MTAS (2007), from the annual report of the Public Employment Service (INEM) and from the 
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reports of public servants’ associations. Municipal tax revenues come from MEH (2008b) and 
other sources. Tax revenues include the so-called REF resources that accrue to Canarias due 
to its special fiscal regime and the intake of the indirect tax (IPSI) that replaces VAT and 
tariffs in the Ceuta and Melilla. We also take into account the fees charged by the Central 
Administration and by certain regulatory agencies, and the property and financial income of 
the Central and Social Security Administrations. The net operating surplus of certain public 
enterprises that operate various parts of the transportation system are included in the 
expenditure side of the SRPA with a negative sign in order to integrate them into an 
aggregate that measures public expenditure on infrastructure and transportation services net 
of user charges. 
On the revenue side, we include all Central Government taxes, including those that have 
been entirely devolved to the regions and those whose revenue is shared with regional and 
local administrations, as well as regional taxes in a strict sense (those established by the 
regional governments) and local taxes and user charges. As will be seen below, the tax 
revenues of the autonomous communities and local administrations will also appear on the 
SRPA as an expenditure item within the heading of regional and local financing. As a result, 
they will have an effect on net regional fiscal balances only to the extent that the tax burden is 
shifted to other regions. Hence, these taxes are treated as if they were collected by the Central 
Government and their revenues were then transferred to regional and local administrations. 
As already noted, the intake of some of these taxes will be decomposed into two components: 
a homogeneous component that will try to approximate the revenues that would have been 
collected under a unique tax schedule for the whole country, and a second component that 
will reflect the (positive or negative) supplementary fiscal effort of each region’s residents.  
Table 2 shows the composition of the public revenues we are considering, disaggregated by 
source of revenue and by receiving administration. In the column corresponding to the 
autonomous communities (CCAA) we have included their participation in the big shared 
taxes (personal income tax, VAT and excise taxes) and the intake of the so called “traditional 
devolved taxes” (estate tax, wealth tax, stamp duties and taxes on games of chance) as well as 
that of other minor taxes that have been entirely devolved to the regions (vehicle 
matriculation tax and tax on retail sales of fuel). We also include in this category the revenue 
of the taxes managed by the so-called Foral Territories of Navarre and the Basque Country 
(after the adjustment that is applied to bring these territories’ share of revenues from VAT 
and excise taxes in line with their consumption). This category includes certain taxes (such as 
the corporate income tax) that correspond entirely to the Central Government in the rest of 
Spain. 
The column corresponding to the Local Administrations includes these administrations’ 
share of certain national taxes, as well as the main municipal taxes. Finally, the Catholic 
Church shows up in the table because it receives a share of income tax revenue, as 
determined by taxpayers, who have the option of assigning a small fraction of their taxes to 




Table 2: Classification of public revenues, year 2005 
Liquid tax intake, thousands of euros 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Total revenue % of total 
Central 
 Adm.**** CCAA*** Local adm. 
Catholic 
Church 
1. Direct taxes 98.646.065 28,46% 69.860.681 28.095.514 548.631 141.239 
Personal income tax 59.133.365 17,06% 35.952.948 22.490.547 548.631 141.239 
Corporate income tax 34.326.578 9,90% 32.495.275 1.831.303   
Tax on non-resident income 1.402.180 0,40% 1.350.529 51.651   
Estate and gift taxes 2.392.621 0,69% 24.164 2.368.457   
Wealth tax 1.391.321 0,40% 37.765 1.353.556   
       2. Indirect taxes 100.567.884 29,01% 45.031.175 54.192.617 1.344.091  
VAT 55.040.365 15,88% 32.285.029 22.261.538 493.798  
Excise taxes* 18.765.698 5,41% 9.973.769 8.593.729 198.201  
Electricity 925.511 0,27% -52.236 977.747   
Vehicle Matriculation 1.791.165 0,52% 257 1.790.908   
Tariffs  1.485.462 0,43% 1.485.462 0   
Tax on insurance premia 1.402.663 0,40% 1.314.002 88.661   
Stamp duty 15.621.009 4,51% 9.562 15.611.447   
Tax on retail fuel sales 1.180.797 0,34% 1.180.797   
Taxes on games of chance 1.900.357 0,55% 15.330 1.885.027   
REF Canarias**  1.460.170 0,42% 808.078 652.092  
IPSI Ceuta and Melilla 135.587 0,04% 135.587   
Taxes established by regions 859.099 0,25% 859.099   
       3. Local taxes and user 
charges 19.834.969 5,72%  19.834.969  
       4. Social Contributions 110.153.027 31,78% 110.153.027    
To Social Security 88.192.339 25,44% 802.847    
Unemployment and wage 
guarantee 19.215.034 5,54% 19.215.034    
To civil servant associations 1.942.807 0,56% 1.942.807    
To public pension scheme 802.847 0,23% 802.847    
       5. User charges, fees and other 
revenues 17.440.866 5,03% 17.440.866    
User charges and proceedings of 
sales of goods and services 4.141.665 1,19% 4.141.665    
Financial and property income 13.299.201 3,84% 13.299.201    
       total 346.642.812 100,00% 242.485.750 82.288.131 21.727.692 141.239 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
   Notes: 
(*): Excise taxes on alcoholic drinks, fuel and tobacco 
(**): The Canary Islands’ REF resources are shown in gross terms (i.e. before discounting the region’s 
compensation to the Central Government for the suppression of the IGTE, the General Tax on Business 
Activity) and include the part that corresponds to the local administrations. 
 (***): The column corresponding to regions (CCAA) also includes the tax revenue of the provincial tax 
authorities of the foral regions and some tax revenue of the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla. 
 (****) Central Administration = Central Government organisms and Ministries and Social Security 
Administration. 
   Sources:  
- Central and regional taxes: MEH (2007a and 2008a) and MHAP (2012a). Liquid tax intake. 
- Municipal tax revenues are those corresponding to IBI, IVTM, IIVTNU, IAE e ICIO and are taken from  
MEH (2008b). Data for Ceuta and Melilla (including IPSI and municipal taxes) are taken from MHAP 
(2013). Those on the Canary Islands’ REF resources come from IGCAC (2006?).  
- User charges, fees and other revenues of the Central Administration: includes Social Security and 
certain regulatory organisms (CMT, CNE, CNMV and Bank of Spain). 
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 Table 3: Classification of public expenditure, year 2005 
Recognized budget obligations, thousands of euros 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 




G1. General Administration and Public Goods and Services of National 
Scope and General Interest 
 
14.866.455 4,5% 
1.1.  Higher State Institutions 479.230 0,1% 
1.2. Foreign Relations 1.400.013 0,4% 
1.3. Defense 8.218.226 2,5% 
1.4. Financial, tax and budgetary management 1.828.508 0,6% 
1.5. Other services of general interest 808.081 0,2% 
1.6. Basic research, other studies and statistics 1.667.907 0,5% 
1.7. Economic regulators 464.489 0,1% 
   G2. Properly regionalizable expenditure 174.959.261 53,3% 
2.1. Homogenized regional financing (for standard functions)  103.407.676 31,5% 
    At standard fiscal effort 104.163.731 31,7% 
    Supplementary regional fiscal effort -756.055 -0,2% 
2.2. Local financing 34.773.232 10,6% 
   a. Provinces and islands 5.934.737 1,8% 
   b. Municipalities 28.838.496 8,8% 
2.3. Productive and environmental infrastructures, transport and 
communications 14.386.899 4,4% 
2.4. Regional aid         6.442.624 2,0% 
2.5. Other regionalizable expenditure 15.948.829 4,9% 
       a. Health care and consumer protection 3.457.354 1,1% 
       b. Education  702.160 0,2% 
       c. Justice, prisons, public security and traffic 9.700.830 3,0% 
       d. Housing and urbanism 898.925 0,3% 
       e. Culture and sports 1.189.560 0,4% 
   G3. Social protection 106.183.619 32,3% 
3.1. Pensions, unemployment and other pecuniary benefits 102.995.646 31,4% 
3.2. Social services 1.303.196 0,4% 
3.3. Support services and administration for Social Security 1.884.776 0,6% 
   G4. Economic regulation and promotion 15.499.569 4,7% 
4.1. General issues, economics and employment 6.432.897 2,0% 
4.2. Agriculture, animal husbandry and fisheries 7.682.205 2,3% 
4.3. Industry, energy, tourism and others 1.384.466 0,4% 
   G5. Interest payments on Central Government debt 16.964.382 5,2% 
   G. TOTAL NON-FINANCIAL EXPENDITURE 328.473.285 100,0% 
   F6. Selected financial operations 12.602.374  
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 3 shows the breakdown of public expenditure into five categories that have very 
different objectives and bear very different relations to the territory. The first of these 
categories includes public goods and services of national scope and general interest, that is, things 
such as defense, international relations or the operating cost of the higher state institutions 
such as the Crown or the Parliament that benefit all Spanish citizens to the same extent, 
independently of where they live and independently of where these goods, services and 
institutions are produced or located. The third item captures expenditure on social services and 
benefits, including pensions and unemployment benefits. These are personal entitlements, 
with perfectly divisible benefits, that are assigned throughout the country with uniform 
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criteria that have to do with the economic and personal circumstances of each citizen. The 
fourth group of programs includes expenditure on economic regulation and promotion, 
including subsidies to enterprises and sectors that are assigned in accordance with economic 
and sectorial criteria. The fifth group includes interest payments on the Central Government’s 
debt. 
The second section of Table 3 contains what we will call properly regionalizable expenditure, 
which can be roughly defined as spending in services or benefits to which citizens have 
access as a function of their place of residence. This category includes the financing of the 
regional and local administrations, several national and European regional aid programs, 
Central Government investment on productive infrastructure (mostly transportation 
networks) and its expenditure on education, health care and other public goods and services 
that are consumed collectively at the local and regional level, such as public security and 
cultural installations. In general terms, we are dealing with the financing of services that must 
be produced locally and that are either collectively consumed by the population of a given 
territory or at least cover needs that are linked more closely to the size of the population than 
to its characteristics. Unlike what happens in relation to the other expenditure categories 
listed above, these features imply that deviations from equal per capita expenditure across 
territories are in principle suspect and may alert us of possible inequities in the allocation of 
public resources. It is true that in some cases, such as regional development programs, it 
would be illogical to expect an egalitarian allocation of expenditure, but even then, per capita 
expenditure would still be a relevant piece of information that should be made explicit and 
evaluated in each case in the light of the program’s benefits. 
Appendix 1 (DBU, 2014a) contains a detailed listing the budgetary programs that existed in 
2005, classified into the different groups we have just described. Some programs that include 
very different types of expenditures are divided into subprograms that fit into different 
sections of the SRPA. Table 3 also includes a sixth item that captures selected financial 
operations, including the purchase of stocks and other financial assets and the granting of 
loans to enterprises and other entities, such as research institutions. Although these activities 
are not expenditures in the strict sense of the term, they also consume resources that must be 
generated by the public sector.  
In the remainder of this section we describe the construction of some components of properly 
regionalizable expenditure that require fairly elaborate adjustments in order to allow 
homogenous comparisons across regions. 
 
 2.2. Regional financing 
In order to be truly comparable across regions, data on regional financing need to be 
homogenized to neutralize the effects of the important asymmetries that exist in Spain in 
terms of regional responsibilities, as well as those arising from the use regions have made of 
their capacity to raise or lower devolved taxes. In this section we describe the necessary 
calculations, distinguishing between common regime autonomous communities and the so-
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called Foral Terrritories of Navarre and the Basque Country, which enjoy a very different 
financing system from the rest of Spain. 
 
Table 4: Construction of homogenized regional financing, 
common regime autonomous communities and autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 detalle ajustes 
Central Govt grants under 
the regional financing 
system 
Advances for 2005 and liquidation payments for 2003 
for the Sufficiency Fund and Health Care Guarantee – 
transfers to the Central Government for negative 
Sufficiency Fund allocations  
+ regional participation in 
taxes shared with the 
Central Government, 
homogenized revenues 
Regional shares in personal income tax (PIT), VAT and 
excise taxes, including the one on electricity 
consumption. For PIT, we use the homogenized or 
normative revenues provided by the regional financing 
system  
+ homogenized revenues 
from totally devolved taxes 
Regional revenues from estate and wealth taxes, taxes 
on games of chance, vehicle matriculation and retail 
fuel sales. Homogenized revenues.  
+ Canary Islands’ REF 
resources 
REF revenues accruing to the autonomous Community 
of the Canary Islands (rather than to their local 
administrations), net of the compensation to the 
Central Gov’t for the elimination of the tax on business 
turnover (IGTE)  
+ Central Gov’t expenditure 
in Ceuta and Melilla 
Direct expenditure by the Central Gov’t (CG) and the 
Social Security system on education, health care and 






+ other revenues of Ceuta 
and Melilla 
Revenues from the tax on production, services and 
imports (IPSI) and CG compensations linked to this tax  
- financing for non-standard 
competences 
Advances and liquidation payments from the 
Sufficiency Fund earmarked for non-standard 
responsibilities, transferred only to some regions 




= financing for homogeneous competences at equal fiscal effort   
+ supplementary fiscal effort 
Revenues from taxes created by the autonomous 
communities + supplementary fiscal effort on devolved 
taxes  
= observed financing for homogeneous competences   
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
  
Table 4 describes the construction of a homogeneous regional financing aggregate for the 
common regime regions and, at least approximately, for the autonomous cities of Ceuta and 
Melilla. First, we consider the revenues of these territories that appear as Central Government 
grants in the General Central Budget of the year we are considering, that is, the advances of 
the Sufficiency Fund for 2005 and the final “liquidation” payment for the balance of that 
Fund and the Health Care Guarantee corresponding to 2003, which were paid, as usual, with 
a two-year lag in 2005 once all the data needed for the required calculations became available. 
Next, we add the revenue of devolved taxes, measured with a homogeneous criterion that 
attempts to approximate the revenue that each region would have obtained with a common 
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tax schedule for the entire country.2, Within this item we include the advances and 
liquidation payments corresponding to the important taxes that are shared with the Central 
Government (personal income tax, VAT and excises) and the revenue from taxes that are 
entirely devolved to the regions and are not subject to a liquidation process (estate and 
wealth taxes, stamp duties, taxes on games of chance, retail sales tax on fuel, vehicle 
matriculation taxes and the Canary Islands REF resources).3 Finally, in the case of Ceuta and 
Melilla we move into regional financing (subtracting it from the original budget program) 
Central Government’s expenditure on education, health care and social services because such 
services are managed by the autonomous communities in the rest of Spain. We also add to 
the revenues of these autonomous cities the intake of the tax on production, services and 
imports (IPSI)—the indirect tax that replaces VAT and tariff duties in these two North-
African cities. 
In this manner we obtain a regional financing aggregate at equal or standard fiscal effort from 
which we need to subtract the resources earmarked for those “singular competences” such as 
the police, the prison system or the Courts’ personnel that have only been transferred to some 
autonomous communities. The resources that have been assigned to these responsibilities are 
moved out of regional financing and into those sections of the SRPA that reflect Central 
Government expenditure on the same areas in most regions. At this point, we arrive at an 
indicator of regional financing for homogeneous competences at equal fiscal effort that can be 
directly compared across all common regime regions (and, at least approximately, also for 
Ceuta and Melilla). Finally, we add to this aggregate those tax revenues that entail a 
supplementary fiscal effort on the part of the regions to obtain a measure of observed financing 
for homogeneous competences. This aggregate includes the intake of those taxes that have been 
established by the regions themselves as well as the extra revenues obtained by raising tax 
rates on devolved taxes. It should be noted that in many cases supplementary fiscal effort is 
negative, as most regions have used their tax autonomy to reduce rates rather than to raise 
them. 
Table 5 describes the calculations that are required in the case of the so-called Foral 
Communities of the Basque Country and Navarre. These regions enjoy a special fiscal and 
financing regime under which they collect practically all taxes, keep the proceeds and pay 
only a set compensation to the Central Government that should in principle cover the cost of 
those services that have not been transferred to them. In this case, we start out with the 
                                                
2 In some cases, the Central Government Tax Agency (AEAT) directly calculates the revenues that each 
community would have obtained if it had not made use of its autonomy to modify the reference tax 
schedule set by the Central Government. Whenever possible, we use these data. For those taxes that are 
collected directly by the regions (the so-called traditional devolved taxes), however, this magnitude is 
not calculated, so we need to approximate it. The way this is done is discussed in Appendix 3 (DBU, 
2014a). The procedure used depends on the information that is available for each tax and in some cases 
is far from ideal. We do believe, however, that our approach provides a better approximation to the 
magnitude we would ideally like to measure than the “normative revenues” provided by the regional 
financing system, which are obtained by updating with various ad-hoc indices the real revenues of each 
tax in the moment of its devolution to the regions. 
3 We are not taking into account regional revenues from user charges and fees due to the lack of 
homogeneous information and the small size of this item. 
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homogenized revenues of devolved taxes (practically all of them except for social 
contributions). Next we introduce the (in principle) technical adjustments that are required to 
bring the distribution of revenues from the key indirect taxes between the Central 
Government and the Foral administrations in line with the relevant consumption of their 
residents. To arrive at net financing, from the result of the previous calculations we have to 
subtract the transfers that flow from the Foral Regions to the Central Government to cover 
their share of the cost of the common services provided centrally. This transfer is known as el 
cupo in the Basque Country and as la aportación in Navarre. At this point, we also take into 
account certain minor transfers across administrations that correspond to financial 
compensations that were negotiated when certain excise taxes were devolved to the Foral 
territories. 
 
Table 5: Construction of homogenized regional financing, 
Foral Territories of Navarre and the Basque Country 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
homogenized revenues 
from devolved taxes 
collected by the foral 
regions 
Regional homogenized revenues from devolved 
taxes, including PIT, Corporate Income Tax, VAT 
on domestic transactions and excise taxes  
 + consumption 
adjustment on VAT and 
excises 
Adjustments to adapt revenue shares to shares in 
the consumption of taxed goods  
- transfers to the Central 
Government 
Contribution of the foral regions to common 
services provided by the Central Gov’t + negotiated 
financial compensation for some devolved excise 
taxes  
- financing for non-
standard competences 
Imputed cost of certain competences that are 
directly financed by the Central Gov’t in the rest of 
Spain 




= financing for homogeneous competences at equal fiscal effort   
+ supplementary fiscal 
effort 
Revenues from taxes created by the autonomous 
communities + supplementary fiscal effort on 
devolved taxes  
= observed financing for homogeneous competences   
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
From the result of these calculations, we need to subtract the estimated costs of a series of 
competences that have been transferred to the foral regions but not to the common regime 
territories (or at least to most of them). Two very important ones are the police and tax 
collection services (including the management of the property registry or catastro). A third 
one has to do with the financing of the local administrations. While in the rest of Spain these 
administrations receive substantial grants from the Central Government, in the Basque 
Country and Navarre, the transfers come mostly from the provincial administrations, which 
are the ones that collect most taxes and then transfer part of those resources to the Central 
Government and, in the case of the Basque Country, also to the Regional Government. 
Finally, there is a fairly long list of areas in which Central Government expenditure is zero in 
the Foral Regions, or at least much lower than in the common regime territories. This 
situation arises in connection with investment in roads and highways, housing subsidies, 
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social services and non-contributive social benefits and in some programs in the areas of 
culture, agriculture and other areas.  
After subtracting the estimated cost of these competences (see below), we arrive at a measure 
of regional financing at homogeneous competences and equal fiscal effort that is directly 
comparable with its counterpart for the common regime autonomous communities. As in 
these regions, observed financing at homogenous competences is obtained by adding each 
region’s supplementary fiscal effort to regional financing at standard fiscal effort – that is, by 
adding to the homogenized revenues of devolved taxes the intake of those taxes that have 
been created by the foral territories and the extra revenue arising from increases in tax rates 
on devolved taxes – or, more frequently, deducting from the homogenized tax intake the loss 
of revenue that results from reductions in tax rates. 
 
 Adjustments for atypical competences 
As we have seen, not all autonomous communities have the same competences. Differences 
across them tend to complicate comparisons in terms of overall regional financing and the 
level of spending in certain services. To avoid this problem, we have introduced a number of 
adjustments that essentially consist in moving certain expenditure and revenue items around 
so that they are in the same section of the SCTP in all regions.  
Table 6 shows the main adjustments we have introduced. Starting from the end, we have the 
case of the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla, where the Central Government is still 
responsible for the provision of health care, education and social services that in the rest of 
the country are managed by the autonomous communities. To make the figures for these 
cities comparable to those for the autonomous communities, we need to add Central 
Government expenditure on such services (row 7) to “regional” financing, which is where 
such resources appear in the rest of the country. Proceeding in a similar way but in the 
opposite direction, Central Government grants earmarked for the financing of certain non-
standard competences that have been transferred only to certain autonomous communities, 
such as the police and the prison system in Catalonia, (row 8) are moved out of regional 
financing and into the expenditure category that is appropriate in each case.  
The first block of adjustments (rows 1 to 6) concerns the Foral regions and is similar to the last 
correction discussed in the previous paragraph except in that there generally does not exist 
an explicit official valuation of each competence. The general procedure in such cases consists 
in imputing to the affected regions a fictional expenditure for the relevant concept such that 
total per capita expenditure in each region (including both the correction and actual Central 
Government expenditure whenever it is not zero) should be equal to average expenditure per 
capita on the same service in the rest of Spain. The total amount of the correction is subtracted 
from regional financing and added to Central Government expenditure on the relevant 
concept. In this manner, the adjusted regional financing we calculate for the Foral 
Communities is shown net of the cost of financing, at the average level observed in the rest of 
Spain, those services that don’t have a budgetary cost for other regional governments. The 
regional expenditure on such services is moved to other headings so as to allow 
 16 
homogeneous comparisons regarding certain expenditure items that are managed by the 
Central Government in some cases and by the autonomous communities or even provincial 
administrations in other cases. 
 
Table 6: Main adjustments for non-standard competences 
___________________________________________________________ 
Competences: Affected regions:      Valuation criterion/ correction: 
   1. Tax collection and property 
registry 
Foral regions Same total per capita expenditure as in the 
rest of Spain (STPCE) 
2. Local financing Foral regions STPCE 
3. Housing, culture, highways, 
education, social services, 
agriculture…. 
Foral regions STPCE with some exceptions 
4. Court system, promotion of 
regional languages 
Foral regions Same per capita expenditure as in the 
common-regime regions that have assumed 
the competence 
5. Police Foral regions Valuation based on the cost of the Catalan 
police. 
6. Non-contributive pensions Foral regions Observed expenditure in Foral regions 
7. Health, education and social 
services 
Ceuta and Melilla Move observed Central Gov’t Expenditure 
into regional financing 
8. Non-standard competences of 





Move resources earmarked for non-standard 
competences from regional financing into 
the appropriate item 
__________________________________________________________ 
- Note: For additional details see section 2.1 of Appendix 2 and the detailed descriptions of the budget 
programs indicated there. 
 
In some instances, we have additional information that can be used to improve our valuation 
of non-standard competences. In the case of the court system, the promotion of regional 
languages or the police (rows 5 and 6), the relevant competences have been transferred also to 
other common regime territories for which we do have an official valuation that can be used 
as a reference to estimate their cost in the Foral regions. In the case of the police, the 
calculation is a bit more complicated (see the discussion of the program AF14 in section 2.1 of 
Appendix 4 in DBU, 2014a) because we need to take into account the different strengths of 
the various regional police forces (relative to the size of the relevant population). Finally, in 
the case of non-contributive pensions, we use the observed cost of the competence for the 
Foral administration. The reason is that, since in this case the Foral regions simply apply a 
uniform national law, the volume of expenditure is in principle independent of the 
Administration that manages the service. The same procedure is also used in the case of the 
economic benefits for handicapped people that are included in expenditure on social services.  
 
 2.3. General Structure of the SRPA 
Table 7 summarizes the structure of the SRPA. On the revenue side, we start from the 
homogenized tax revenues of the Central and Regional Administrations, possibly augmented 
or diminished by the supplementary fiscal effort of the autonomous communities and the tax 
reductions arising from the special fiscal regimes that are applied in the Foral Regions, the 
Canary Islands and Ceuta and Melilla. Next, we incorporate local taxes and user charges, 
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social contributions and other revenues of the Central Administration to arrive at the total 
revenues of the hypothetical augmented Central Administration with which we are working. 
 
Table 7: General Structure of the SRPA 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
I. REVENUE 
I1. Homogenized tax revenues of the Central and Regional Administrations 
 I1.1. Homogenized direct taxes 
 I1.2. Homogenized indirect taxes 
I2. Supplementary regional fiscal effort and tax reductions in Canarias and Ceuta 
and Melilla 
I3. Local taxes and user charges 
I4. Social contributions 
I5. Other revenues of the Central Administration 
  I5.1. User charges, public prices and proceeds from the sale of goods and services 
  I5.2. Other financial and property income 
 Total revenue at equal fiscal effort = I1 + I3 + I4 + I5 
Observed total revenue = (I1 + I3 + I4 + I5) + I2 
 G. EXPENDITURE 
G1. General administration and national goods and services 
G2. Properly regionalizable expenditure 
  G2.1 Regional financing 
   Homogenized regional revenues 
  - resources for non-standard competences of the common regime territories* 
   +/- other adjustments for non-standard competences: foral regions and Ceuta and                              
Melilla* 
  = Financing at homogeneous competences and equal fiscal effort 
   + supplementary regional fiscal effort 
  = Observed financing at homogeneous competences 
  G2.2. Local financing  
  G2.3. Productive and environmental infrastructure and expenditure on transport 
  G2.4. Regional aid  
  G2.5. Other regionalizable expenditure: health, education, public security… 
G3. Social protection 
G4. Economic regulation and promotion 
G5. Interest on the Central Government Debt 
 Total expenditure = G1 + G2 + G3 + G4 + G5 
Total expenditure at equal fiscal effort = total expenditure – supplementary fiscal effort 
 F6: Selected financial operations 
R. Personal redistributions = G3 – I1 – I4 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
- Note: (*) The amounts that are added to or subtracted from regional financing as part of these 
corrections come from or are added to other expenditure items. 
 
On the expenditure side, we pay special attention to the construction of an indicator of 
regional financing at homogeneous competences and equal fiscal effort that can be used to 
make valid comparisons across all regions, including the Foral Territories. As we have seen, 
the adjustments for non-standard competences that are required to arrive at this aggregate 
require different items to be moved from regional financing to other headings or the other 
way around. We also analyze in some detail the rest of regionalizable expenditure, which is 
the most interesting budget heading from our perspective since it is here that legitimate 




 3. Imputation criteria for public revenues and expenditures 
In order to complete the SRPA we need to allocate the public revenues and expenditures we 
are considering across the different Spanish regions, including Ceuta and Melilla as an 
additional territory to be added to the seventeen autonomous communities. Although the 
literature describes a number of possible approaches to this task, the only one that is 
appropriate given the paper’s objective is, as we have already noted, the burden-benefit 
approach. In this methodology, public expenditure is assigned to the region of residence of its 
beneficiaries, i.e. the citizens that are the consumers or recipients of the relevant goods, 
services or pecuniary benefits – and not to its direct producers, who may be the immediate 
recipients of public expenditure in exchange for their work or for the production of 
intermediate goods and services but are not in any case the intended final beneficiaries of 
those services. In the same manner, tax revenues and social contributions are assigned to the 
region of residence of the taxpayers that ultimately bear the burden of each tax, who are not 
necessarily those that make the actual payment in the first place and could even reside in a 
different territory from the one where the taxable transaction took place. 
An important qualification to this rule is that public revenues and expenditure are assigned 
entirely to the residents of Spain (to whom we may refer in occasion as “Spaniards” or 
“citizens” for the sake of brevity). Those expenditure items whose direct beneficiaries are 
non-residents (“foreigners”) such as foreign aid or benefits for Spanish migrants living in 
foreign countries, are distributed across all Spanish regions in proportion to their resident 
population, as measured in the municipal register (padrón). The same procedure is followed 
for the part of the tax revenues of Spanish administrations that are born by non-residents 
(mostly foreign tourists and the buyers of Spanish exports). The first part of this convention 
fits well, as will be seen below, with the criterion we have used to allocate those expenditure 
items that have a uniform effect on the entire population. The second part has been adopted 
so that the distribution of the taxes born by non-residents will not distort the regional 
distribution of the fiscal burden that is born by Spanish residents, which is really what 
concerns us.  
Unlike some earlier studies (see for instance IEF, 2006) we have not constructed a second, 
alternative distribution of revenues and expenditure following the so-called monetary flow 
approach. The use of this allocation procedure is often justified with the argument that it 
provides a better approximation to the impact of the public sector on the economic activity of 
the different territories. In our opinion, however, the only relevant thing from the point of 
view of the discussion that motivates the present study are the direct effects of public 
programs and not their possible indirect effects on employment and economic activity. 
Moreover, we seriously doubt that the monetary approach adequately captures such effects, 
since in most cases the relevant fact would not be where public expenditure materializes, 
which is the criterion followed under the monetary flow approach, but rather the place where 
the relevant goods and services have been produced, which is generally not known. 
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 3.1. Imputation criteria for expenditure programs 
When it comes to the imputation of public expenditure, it seems natural to start out from a 
classification of budget programs in terms of the territorial scope of the benefits they 
generate. For our purposes, it will be convenient to distinguish first of all between public goods 
and services of national scope and other items whose benefits do not in principle extend beyond 
the territory of an autonomous community. Within the first group, we can then distinguish 
between public goods and services that benefit all citizens in the same way and those that 
benefit certain segments of the population more directly or with a greater intensity 
depending on their place of residence, their age, the sector in which they work or some other 
characteristic. We will refer to the first category as public goods and services of national scope and 
general interest. This group constitutes section G1 of our expenditure classification and 
includes classical examples of pure public goods of national scope, with indivisible and non-
excludable benefits, such as foreign relations, defense or the political and administrative 
superstructure of the State, including the bulk of the activities of certain political and 
administrative ministries. All these expenditure programs will be distributed across regions 
in proportion to their average population during the year of interest, approximated by the 
average of beginning and end-of-year resident population according to the municipal 
population register or padrón. 
The second category includes those public goods and services of national scope that have an 
uneven impact on different groups of citizens. This heading includes expenditure programs 
of very different nature that are generally included in sections G2 and G4 of the SRPA. They 
are distributed across autonomous communities in proportion to indicators that attempt to 
approximate the regional distribution of their beneficiaries. In some cases, the relevant 
population subgroup is spread throughout the entire country but its distribution may differ 
from that of the overall population. For instance, certain general programs of sectorial 
Ministries such as Education and Health, including regulation, planning and coordination 
activities, will be imputed in proportion to the beneficiary population that resides in each 
territory (e.g. the number of students enrolled in the school system or the age-weighted 
population variable that is used in Spain to approximate health care expenditure needs). In 
the same manner, the central services of sectorial economic ministries, such as Agriculture 
and Industry, and subsidies to certain economic sectors will be imputed in proportion to 
indicators of sectorial activity, such as Gross Value Added, employment or touristic revenues. 
Investment in transport infrastructure and expenditure on the management and supervision 
of transport activities will be allocated taking into account both their localization and the 
residence of its ultimate beneficiaries, which will be approximated using data on passenger 
traffic by place of residence and of merchandise traffic by origin and destination. This is 
discussed in greater detail in Appendix 2 (DBU, 2014a). 
We can also include in the same category of expenditure of national scope but possibly 
uneven impact all those goods and services that have a greater impact on those territories in 
which they are located or produced but which also contribute to the welfare of residents in 
other regions through spillover effects of various types whose magnitude and distribution are 
 20 
hard to approximate directly. Among other things, we include in this category investment on 
cultural installations of national interest, such as the Prado Museum or Barcelona’s Liceu 
Theatre. These are investments that benefit all Spaniards to some extent, but much more so 
those who happen to live close by and therefore have easier access to them and to the 
economic benefits generated by the tourism they attract. The same is true of many 
expenditure programs that focus on environmental protection, public security or the Court 
System. Typically, such programs generate benefits that spread to residents in other areas. 
Since it is generally very difficult to establish with any precision what part of such benefits 
corresponds to each territory, in many cases we have decided to adopt a generic solution, to 
which we will refer as the standard correction for spillovers, that attempts to be prudent and 
hopefully generates reasonable results at least on average. In these cases, 75% of the relevant 
expenditure will be imputed to the region in which it physically materializes, while the 
remaining 25% will be distributed across all regions in proportion to their population and 
GDP, with equal weights. 
The remainder of public expenditure (which will correspond mostly to categories G2 and G3 
of the SRPA) finances the purchase of goods and services or the provision of cash benefits 
that benefit individual citizens or groups of them that do not extend beyond the borders of an 
autonomous community. In many cases, the allocation of the benefits arising from a given 
expenditure item does not raise any problems. Such is the case, for instance, when we are 
dealing with local goods or services (e.g. public municipal transportation), transfers to local 
administrations, cash benefits such as pensions or unemployment subsides, and collective 
services such as health or education that must be locally produced in each territory. 
In other cases, practical or conceptual problems do arise. A very frequent one has to do with 
the tendency of public accounting systems to impute to Madrid more than its share of certain 
expenditure items. In some cases, the regional distribution of expenditure that is provided is 
rather implausible and suggests that certain things are being wrongly assigned to Madrid in 
their entirety, including transfers to organizations and business firms that have their 
headquarters in Madrid but operate throughout the country, or operating expenditures of 
Central Government units which provide general services that should be distributed across 
all regions. The problem is easy enough to solve when Madrid appears as the only recipient 
of transfers to national organizations or other such expenditures that clearly generate national 
benefits, since it then suffices to reclassify the transfer as central services and distribute it 
across regions in proportion to some appropriate indicator. The problem is a bit more 
complicated when Madrid does not appear as the only recipient of suspect expenditure but it 
is assigned a disproportionately large share of it. In such cases, we proceed as follows. First, 
we calculate average expenditure per capita in the other autonomous communities (possibly 
excluding the Foral Regions, depending on the nature of the program being considered). 
Next, we multiply this figure by Madrid’s population to obtain an estimate of the expenditure 
that would correspond to Madrid per se. The remainder of the expenditure originally 
attributed to Madrid is moved to central services and distributed across all regions with the 
criterion that seems more appropriate in each case.  
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A type of expenditure that we often encounter captures the operating costs of administrative 
units that provide central and support services to Ministries and other organisms. These staff 
units generally perform a double function. On the one hand, they support other programs 
whose benefits can be allocated across regions, such as pension or unemployment benefits 
and infrastructure investments, and on the other, they perform functions that can be 
considered public goods of national scope, including planning and the preparation of 
legislation, the gathering and dissemination of statistics and coordination with other national 
and foreign administrations and with international organisms. Given this double function, 
one part of their expenditures will be allocated in proportion to the regionalized expenditure 
of the relevant organism, and the rest will be distributed in proportion to some general 
indicator of the location of the beneficiaries of the unit’s work, which may be based on 
population, value added or employment. 
Table 8 summarizes the criteria we have used to distribute across regions the different types 
of expenditure programs and the main sources of information used in each case. In Appendix 
2 (DBU, 2014a) we provide a discussion of the programs that are included in each area and of 
the relevant allocation criteria. Appendix 4 (DBU, 2014a) includes a detailed description of 
how each program has been distributed across regions.  
 
Table 8: Allocation criteria and main sources and indicators 
Used to regionalize public expenditure 
___________________________________________________________ 
Group of programs Allocation criteria and indicators      Indicator/source 
   G1. Gral. Administration and 
public goods and services of 
national scope & gral. interest 
Benefit all citizens equally; resident 
population 
Avge. population, municipal 
register (INE, 2013a) 
   G2. Regionalizable expenditure   
   2.1. Regional financing Region that receives transfers from the 
Central Gov’t or revenues from devolved 
taxes 
LIQFINAUT, MHAP 
(2012a), MEH (2008a), 
SGCAyL 
2.2. Local financing Region of the local administration that 
receives the transfers or tax revenues 
LIQFINLOC, MEH 
(2008b), SGCAyL 
2.3. Infrastructure and 
transportation 
Location of investment + indices of 
passenger traffic  (by region of residence) 
and merchandise traffic (by origin and 
destination), except for expenditure on 
local transportation (subways and other  
local public transport).  
SICOP, Annual report of the 
Ministry of Public Works 
(MF, 2006), ENTUR 
2.4. Regional aid Region that benefits from the aid or 
residence of its beneficiaries 
MEH (2008a), SICOP, 
IRMC 
2.5. Other regionalizable expend.   
  a. Health care and consumer                         
protection 
Location of the expenditure and equivalent 
population for purposes of health care, for 
general and support services 
SICOP, SICOSS, Min. of 
Health, annual reports of 
civil servant mutual aid 
associations  
   b. Education and training 
 
Location of the expenditure, school 
enrollment and school-age population for 
general and support services 







Table 8: continuation 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
   c. Court System, Prisons, public 
security and traffic  
 
Location of expenditure with standard 
correction for spillovers whenever relevant, 
personnel of the Courts and police. Total 
population for general and support services 
SICOP, JUST, Min. of the 
Interior, SGCAyL 
   d. Housing and urban planning Location of expenditure SICOP, Min. of Public 
Works 
   e. Culture and sports Location of expenditure with correction for 
spillovers in some cases. Total population 
for some programs of national scope 
SICOP, Min. of Culture, 
IGAE 
 
   G3. Social protection   
 3.1 Pensions, unemployment and 
other cash benefits 
Residence of the beneficiaries 
 
SICOSS, SICOP, SPEE, 
IMSERSO, Reports of civil 
servants’ associations 




 3.3. General and support services In proportion to the relevant expenditure in 
other subsections of G3 
  
   G4. Economic regulation and 
promotion 
  
  4.1. General issues Location of expenditure, employment, 
population, Gross Value Added (GVA) 
SICOP, SPEE, CRE 
     4.2 Agriculture, animal 
husbandry and fisheries 
Residence of beneficiaries of grants and in 
its absence location of subsidized 
production. Sectorial GVA for general 
services and some programs of national 
scope 
SICOP, CRE, Min. of 
Agriculture, MEH (2008a) 
     4.3. Industry, commerce, energy, 
tourism and others 
Residence of beneficiaries of grants and in 
its absence location of subsidized 
production. Sectorial GVA for general 
services and some programs of national 
scope 
SICOP, CRE, Min. of  
Industry and Commerce 
   G5. Interest on Central Gov’t 
debt 
In proportion to regionalized public 
expenditure that may have been 
financed in parte with Central Gov’t 
debt. We exclude the tax revenues of 
local and regional administrations, 
grants from the EU and investment 




   - Key:  
CRE = Regional Accounts (INE, 2013). 
ENTUR = Touristic surveys, FAMILITUR and FRONTUR (Instituto de Estudios Turísticos, 2006 a, b y c) 
IGAE = General Controller of the Central Administration (information provided by) 
IMSERSO = Institute for Old Age and Social Services (information provided by) 
IRMC = Institute for the Restructuring of Coal Mining and the Development of Mining Areas  
JUST = Statistics of the Justice System (La justicia dato a dato. Año 2005. Estadística Judicial) (CGPJ, 
2006) 
LIQFINAUT = Annual report on the results of the regional financing system  (MEH, 2005 y 2007a) 
LIQFINLOC = Annual report on the results of the regional financing system  (MEH, 2007b y c) 
SICOP = Accounting information system of the Central Administration 
SICOSS = Accounting information system of the Social Security Administration 
SGCAyL = General Secretariat for Coordination with Local and Regional Administrations (information 
provided by) 
SPEE = Central Public Employment Services (information provided by) 
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 3.2. Imputation criteria for public revenues 
There is a well developed theory of tax incidence that can help us choose reasonable 
assumptions regarding the distribution of the effective burden associated with the different 
taxes that make up the Spanish fiscal system. The most frequently used assumptions in the 
fiscal balances literature may be summarized as follows: direct taxes on households are not 
shifted (i.e. are borne by those who pay them in the first place), social contributions fall on 
workers, indirect taxes on consumers and the corporate income tax is shared by the owners of 
capital, consumers and workers. Relying on these hypotheses, the total revenue of each tax at 
the national level is distributed across regions in proportion to one or several indicators that 
summarize the incidence assumptions that seem more adequate in each case, ignoring 
completely the available information on the geographical distribution of tax revenues 
according to their point of collection in all cases in which taxes may be shifted.4 
 
Table 9: Tax incidence assumptions  
and indicators used to regionalize public revenues 
___________________________________________________________ 
Tax Incidence assumptions      Indicator 
   1. Direct taxes   
   Personal income tax No shifting: born by the 
original taxpayer 
tax witholdings and final payments by region of 
residence of the taxpayer 
   Corporate tax Consumers 1/3 
Capital 1/3 
Workers 1/3 
final consumption by region of residence, 
dividends and similar payments by enterprises 
by residence of recipients 
private sector wage bill by region  
   Devolved direct taxes (estate 
and wealth taxes) 
original taxpayer regionalized revenues, by region of residence of 
the taxpayer 
Non-resident income tax Foreign taxpayers population 
   2. Indirect taxes   
   VAT consumers final consumption and purchases of housing, by 
region of residence 
   Excise taxes consumers final consumption, by region of residence 
   Devolved indirect taxes* consumers final consumption and purchases of housing, by 
region of residence 
   Tariffs and agricultural duties consumers final consumption, by region of residence 
   3. Social contributions workers revenues by region of residence of workers 
4. Local taxes Original taxpayers revenues by region where they are collected 
5. Other revenues of the 
Central Administration 




(*) Stamp duties and taxes on retail sales of fuel.  
 
                                                
4 The available information on tax revenues broken down by region of collection can be extremely 
misleading, especially in the case of those taxes that are collected from business firms, such as VAT and 
Corporate Income Tax. The reason is that such payments are generally centralized in corporate 
headquarters, which are disproportionately located in Madrid, Barcelona and Bilbao. Hence, a 
significant share of the revenues collected in Madrid, Catalonia and the Basque Country are generated 
in other regions. 
 24 
Our incidence assumptions are summarized in Table 9. Table 10 shows the main data sources 
we have used to regionalize the revenues of the Spanish public administrations.  
 
 
Table 10: Main data sources used to regionalize public revenues 
___________________________________________________________ 
Aggregate tax revenue and its distribution: 
MHAP (2012a). Recaudación y estadísticas del sistema tributario español, 2000-2010. (Tax 
revenue statistics) 
Agencia Tributaria (AT, 2006). Informe anual de recaudación tributaria. (Annual report on tax 
revenue). 
MEH (2008a). Haciendas Autonómicas en Cifras 2005. (Key figures on regional finances) 
MEH (2008b). Haciendas Locales en Cifras, año 2005. (Key figures on local finances). 
MEH (2007). Liquidación del sistema de financiación regional. (Annual report on the results 
of the regional financing system). 
Aggregate consumption and consumption of specific goods and services: 
Contabilidad Regional de España. INE (2013b) (Spain’s Regional Accounts) 
Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares. INE (2013c) (Household Budget Survey) 
Instituto de Estudios Turísticos (2006b). EGATUR, Encuesta de Gasto Turístico. (Survey on 
touristic expenditure) 
Liquidaciones de los presupuestos de las AAPP españolas. IGAE (2006), MTAS (2007), IGSS 
(2013), MHAP (2013 a y b) (Annual Budget reports of the Spanish Public Administrations) 
Housing sales 
Housing sales by region of residence of the buyer. Consejo General del Notariado through 
INE. 
CRP (2006). Estadística Registral Inmobiliaria 
Domestic and foreign trade 
MEC (2013). Datacomex, estadísticas del comercio exterior (Foreign trade statistics) 
C-Interreg (2013). Estadísticas de Flujos de Comercio Interregional de mercancías en España 
(Statistcs on cross-regional merchandise trade flows) 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
The most complicated part of the regionalization of public revenues has to do with indirect 
taxes. Revenues linked to these taxes (and part of corporate tax revenues) are regionalized 
using various indicators of what is called for short in Table 8 final consumption by region of 
residence. These indicators (whose construction is discussed in detail in Appendices 5 and 6 of 
DBU, 2014a) summarize the geographical distribution of those flows of final private and 
public consumption that bear different indirect taxes, calculated with criteria that attempt to 
be coherent with the logic of the burden-benefit approach. Thus, the expenditure of Spanish 
households (or more precisely, those who are residents of the country) that directly or 
indirectly bears the tax is distributed according to their region of residence, while the relevant 
expenditure of non-residents (including spending in Spain by foreign tourists and the 
purchase of Spanish exports abroad) is distributed among all Spanish regions in proportion 
to their resident populations so as not to distort the distribution of the burdens that are born 
by residents. 
To regionalize indirect tax revenues, we generally proceed in several stages. First, we use 
data from the input-output matrices to divide the total intake of each tax into a series of items 
that are collected from different agents or correspond to different types of transactions. 
Typically, the most important items are those that correspond to direct final consumption and 
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investment (housing purchases) by households. In many cases, however, a significant fraction 
of revenues comes from final consumption by public administrations or from the purchase of 
intermediate goods by business firms. 
Next, each of these items is distributed across the autonomous communities using indicators 
based on the available data on the geographical distribution of the relevant consumption 
flows. Regarding final consumption and housing purchases by households, the Spanish 
Regional Accounts (Contabilidad Regional de España or CRE) provide  information on aggregate 
consumption broken down by region of residence (this is referred to as regional consumption 
as opposed to interior consumption) and the National Statistical Institute (INE) has provided us 
with data on housing purchases by region of residence of the buyer that have originally been 
collected by the General Council of Notaries. The Household Budget Survey (Encuesta 
Continua de Presupuestos Famiiares, ECPF) provides information on the consumption of 
specific goods and services, also broken down with a residence criterion. There are also some 
data, although much less detailed, on the consumption pattern of foreign tourists in the 
Survey of Touristic Expenditure (EGATUR). Finally, the Survey on Internal Tourism  
(FAMILITUR) provides information on interregional population flows that we have used to 
distribute across regions certain consumption expenditures whose breakdown by region of 
residence is not known with precision. 
Tax revenues that are linked to public consumption are allocated in proportion to 
regionalized indicators of public expenditure subject to tax because the effective burden of 
such taxes is born by the citizens served by these administrations through higher taxes or 
services of lower quality. Public consumption indicators are constructed using data on 
spending by Spanish public administrations on purchases of goods and services and on real 
investment (chapters 2 and 6 of public expenditure budgets). In general, the consumption of 
local and regional administrations is imputed to the regions where they operate, while that of  
the Central Administration is distributed across all regions in proportion to their population 
(with some corrections that are discussed in detail in section 1.5 of Appendix 5 to DBU, 
2014a). 
Finally, tax revenues arising from business expenditure on intermediate inputs or capital 
goods are distributed in proportion to indicators of aggregate final consumption that take 
into account, in addition to domestic private and public consumption, exports to foreign 
countries, except in the case of VAT since exports are not subject to this tax in Spain. As in the 
case of expenditure by foreign tourists while in Spain, taxes linked to exports are distributed 
across all regions in proportion to their population. 
The calculations outlined in the preceding paragraphs are based on homogenized tax 
revenues. This variable, whose construction is discussed in detail in Appendix 3 of DBU 
(2014a), tries to approximate the revenue that each tax would raise in each region if they all 
had applied a common tax schedule that would roughly correspond to the “average 
schedule” in the common regime territories. Hence, the tax intake that is initially regionalized 
is a fictional aggregate that is somewhat different from the tax revenue that is actually 
observed. To estimate the distribution of the observed tax burdens in the case of those taxes 
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whose schedules can be modified by Regional Governments, we need to regionalize the 
“supplementary revenues” that each of them has obtained by raising or lowering taxes. For 
this purpose, we have assumed that one part of these supplementary (positive or negative) 
revenues remains in the region, that a second one corresponds to exports to foreign countries 
and that the third one is distributed across all regions in the same way as the corresponding 
homogenized revenues. The weight of these three components is approximated using data on 
domestic and foreign trade regarding the share of exports to other regions and to other 
countries in the total production of each region. (See section 5 of Appendix 5 of DBU (2014a) 
for additional details). 
  
4. The calculation of net fiscal balances 
As has already been noted in section 2, the need to develop a measure of fiscal balances that 
could be additively decomposed by programs or groups of programs has led us to 
reformulate this concept in relative terms. In this section we describe the calculation of per 
capita and aggregate relative balances, analyze the relationship between relative balances and 
those that are generally constructed in the literature and establish some properties of relative 
balances that turn out to be quite convenient.  
Aside from their additive decomposability, it is worth noting that aggregate relative balances 
add up to zero. This property can be used to neutralize those effects of the business cycle that 
operate through the budgetary balance of the Central Administration, thereby providing a 
clearer picture of the redistributive nature of interregional fiscal flows than non-neutralized 
balances. 
Let Gr, Tr and Pr, respectively denote total public expenditure in region r, the tax burden 
borne by its residents and its total population. We will use lower case letters to denote per 
capita magnitudes (e.g. gr = Gr/Pr) and we will omit the regional subscript to indicate 
aggregate magnitudes or average values in Spain as a whole so that, for instance, P = ∑r Pr 
and g = G/P . 
In this notation, the absolute fiscal balance of a region (AFBr) is given by 
  (1) AFBr = Gr - Tr, 
that is, by the difference between the public expenditure imputed to the region and its total 
tax burden. Notice that the sum of the regional balances defined in this manner is equal to the 
deficit of the public sector, D (or more precisely, to the difference between the public 
revenues and expenditures considered in the analysis, which is not necessarily equal to zero. 
We have, then,  
  (2) ∑r  AFBr = ∑r Gr  - ∑r Tr = G - T ≡ D. 
This property is often considered undesirable because it makes regional fiscal balances very 
sensitive to the budgetary balance of the Central Administration and may obscure somewhat 
the redistributive character of interregional fiscal flows. To reestablish the equality between 
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aggregate costs and benefits, the standard neutralization procedure involves the calculation 
of a hypothetical balanced-budget fiscal balance (NFBr). This neutralized magnitude is 
obtained by adjusting revenues upward or expenditure downward so that they are equal to 
each other. Implicitly, we are imputing the budget imbalance of the Central Administration to 
the different regions according to the following formula 
  (3) NFBr = Gr - Tr - αr(G - T) 
where the regional weights used to impute the Central Government’s deficit must add up to 
one (∑r αr = 1). Notice that the sum of the neutralized regional fiscal balances is zero since 
  (4)  ∑r  NFBr = ∑r Gr - ∑r Tr - ∑r αr(G - T) = (G - T) - (G - T) = 0. 
A standard practice is to define αr as region r’s share in total tax revenue (that is, αr = Tr/T). 
This choice is often justified with the argument that the deficit will eventually have to be 
financed through higher taxes and that, as a first approximation, such additional taxes are 
likely to come from the same regions as current revenues. The procedure, however, is not 
entirely satisfactory because it brings into the calculation of fiscal balances things that are no 
longer observed current fiscal flows. If taxes do indeed go up in the future in order to pay for 
past deficits, this will show up in the fiscal balances of other periods. Moreover, the 
geographical distribution of tax revenues may have varied significantly by then. 
An alternative way to approach the problem consists in computing fiscal balances in relative 
terms. Following de la Fuente (2000), we define the total relative balance of region r (RFBr) as 
the product of its per capita relative balance (rfbpcr and its population, where the per capita 
relative balance is defined as the difference between the net per capita benefits the region 
derives from the activities of the public sector and the average value of the same magnitude 
in Spain as a whole. That is,  
  (5) RFBr = rfbpcr Pr =  [(gr - tr) - (g - t)] Pr  = [(gr - g) - (tr - t)] Pr  
It is easy to show that total relative balances add up to zero across regions, and that the total 
relative balance of a given region is equal to its neutralized balance provided the latter is 
calculated by distributing the Central Government’s budget deficit across regions in 
proportion to their population. Notice that 
  (6)  RFBr =  (Gr - Tr) - (g - t) Pr 
P
P =  (Gr - Tr) - (G - T) 
Pr
P  
which is equal to (3) provided that αr = (Pr/P). Summing over regions, r, we now have  
  (7)   ∑r RFBr =  ∑r  (Gr - Tr) - (G - T)  ∑r 
Pr
P = (G - T) - (G - T) = 0. 
Finally, let us check that relative balances are additively decomposable over programs (which 
is the main reason we have chosen to work with this concept in the first place). Let gir and tkr 
be the per capita expenditures and tax revenues that have been generated in region r by 
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expenditure program i and tax k. Since gr = ∑i gir and tr = ∑k tkr, we can write RFBr as the 
sum of a series of partial balances, each of which will reflect the contribution of a program or 
group of programs to the aggregate regional balance as a function of the population of the 
region and of its per capita treatment in the relevant program: 
  (8)  RFBr = ∑i (gir - gi)Pr - ∑k (tkr - tk)Pr = ∑j rfbpcjr Pr = ∑j RFBjr 
where rfbpcjr is the per capita relative balance generated by budget program j in region r and 
RFBjr the component of the region r’s aggregate fiscal balance that comes from program j.  
  
 5. Aggregate results: the distribution of public revenues and expenditure 
The details of our results are available in an Excel book that shows the geographical 
distribution of each of the revenue and expenditure programs included in the 2005 SRPA and 
of various aggregates of interest. In additional files, the book also shows per capita revenues 
and expenditure in euros per capita and in indices normalized to 100 for the national average, 
and the relative per capita and total net balances generated by each program and by different 
subsets of them.5  
 
Figure 1: Aggregate indices of per capita fiscal burdens and  
benefits derived from public expenditure 
Spain = 100, year 2005 
 
  - Note regions arranged by increasing GDP per capita. 
 
In the remainder of the paper we highlight some aspects of these data. Figure 1 summarizes 
the aggregate results of the analysis. After adding up all expenditure items on one side and 
all revenue items on the other and dividing each of them by regional population, we have 
constructed two indices that measure, respectively, the benefits derived from public 
expenditure and the fiscal burdens per capita of each region, normalizing in each case the 
                                                
5 The file is available at: http://www.fedea.net/hacienda-autonomica/  under “SCPT 2005”; click the 
link at “Resultados detallados 2005”. 
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corresponding national average to 100. The regions are arranged along the horizontal axis by 
increasing order of GDP per capita. 
As expected, the tax burden generally rises with per capita income while expenditure is not 
significantly related to this variable. There are, however, some striking deviations from the 
general pattern. On the revenue side, Ceuta and Melilla, the Canary Islands and the Foral 
Regions display tax burden indices significantly below what may be expected on the basis of 
their income. On the expenditure side, it is worth noting that almost two thirds of the regions 
are outside a 20-percentage point band around the national average. In the upper tail of the 
distribution we again find Ceuta and Melilla and the Foral Regions, which are now joined by 
Asturias, Extremadura, Castilla y León, Cantabria and Aragón. At the other end of the 
distribution, expenditure levels are particularly low in Baleares, Valencia and Murcia. 
 
Table 11: Total revenue and expenditure and absolute fiscal balances 


























Andalucía 50,331 54,996 4,664 3.71% 2,245 6,910 5.50% 
Aragón 10,777 10,740 -37 -0.13% 361 324 1.16% 
Asturias 8,268 10,026 1,758 8.98% 306 2,064 10.55% 
Baleares 8,519 6,430 -2,090 -9.22% 282 -1,808 -7.98% 
Canarias 10,835 13,868 3,033 8.28% 562 3,596 9.81% 
Cantabria 4,556 4,791 236 2.06% 160 396 3.47% 
Castilla y León 18,190 21,256 3,065 6.26% 714 3,779 7.71% 
Cast. - La Mancha 11,853 14,723 2,871 9.37% 543 3,414 11.14% 
Cataluña 66,924 52,147 -14,778 -8.69% 2,005 -12,773 -7.51% 
Valencia 35,166 30,342 -4,824 -5.45% 1,348 -3,476 -3.93% 
Extremadura 5,938 8,939 3,001 19.72% 308 3,309 21.74% 
Galicia 18,232 21,135 2,902 6.25% 785 3,687 7.94% 
Madrid 60,303 41,422 -18,882 -11.75% 1,699 -17,183 -10.70% 
Murcia 9,063 9,062 -1 0.00% 384 383 1.65% 
Navarra 5,130 5,066 -64 -0.42% 170 105 0.68% 
País Vasco 19,290 20,082 793 1.42% 604 1,397 2.50% 
La Rioja 2,489 2,223 -265 -3.96% 86 -179 -2.68% 
Ceuta y Melilla 777 1,226 449 17.34% 40 489 18.89% 
total 346,643 328,473 -18,170 -2.00% 12,602 -5,567 -0.61% 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
   - Note: Absolute balance = expenditure – revenues. 
 
Tables 11 and 12 contain the same information but expressed now in terms of total revenues 
and expenditures and total and per capita relative fiscal balances. The first three columns of 
Table 11 show the calculation of regional absolute balances as the difference between the 
expenditure and the tax revenues imputed to each region, without any correction, and the 
fourth column shows absolute balances measured as a percentage of regional GDP. Notice 
that the sum of the absolute balances is not zero but around -18 billion euros, which basically 
correspond to the Central Government’s budget surplus with the sign changed. The fifth 
column of the table shows the Central Government’s purchases of certain financial assets that 
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are included in appendix F6 of the SRPA, which are distributed across regions in proportion 
to their population and the last two columns show absolute fiscal balances adjusted for 
financial operations, i.e. taking into account the purchase of financial assets that are the 
common property of all citizens.6 
Table 12 shows the per capita and total relative fiscal balances of the Spanish regions and 
their revenue and expenditure components. As we have seen in section 4, working with 
relative balances neutralizes the effects of the budget disequilibrium of the Central 
Government and ensures that the sum of total relative balances is zero. As an indicator of the 
total volume of redistributive flows across regions, the last row of the table shows the sum of 
those regional balances that have a positive sign (which is the same as the sum of the negative 
balances, with the sign changed). According to our calculations, redistributive flows across 
regions in 2005 added up to around 33 billion euros or 3.6% of Spanish GDP. From the point 
of view of net recipient regions (those with positive fiscal balances), net inflows amounted to 
7.2% of their GDP, whereas net outflows from net contributing regions added up to 7.4% of 
their GDP. 
 
Table 12: Relative fiscal balances 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
	  
Total balances, millions of euros 
induced by	    	  











Andalucía	   11,433 -3,532 7,902  6.29%  1,445 -446 999 
Aragón	   -838 1,322 484  1.73%  -658 1,039 380 
Asturias	   137 2,062 2,199  11.24%  127 1,915 2,042 
Baleares	   -775 -908 -1,684  -7.43%  -782 -916 -1,697 
Canarias	   4,636 -792 3,844  10.49%  2,339 -400 1,939 
Cantabria	   -144 611 467  4.09%  -254 1,081 826 
Castilla y León	   1,456 2,639 4,095  8.36%  579 1,048 1,627 
C. - La Mancha	   3,083 570 3,654  11.92%  1,611 298 1,909 
Cataluña	   -11,777 -110 -11,887  -6.99%  -1,667 -16 -1,683 
Valencia	   1,909 -4,790 -2,881  -3.26%  402 -1,008 -607 
Extremadura	   2,532 913 3,445  22.64%  2,334 841 3,175 
Galicia	   3,349 684 4,034  8.69%  1,211 247 1,459 
Madrid	   -13,577 -2,856 -16,433  -10.23%  -2,268 -477 -2,745 
Murcia	   1,498 -945 553  2.38%  1,107 -699 408 
Navarra	   -465 645 180  1.17%  -778 1,079 301 
País Vasco	   -2,669 4,333 1,664  2.97%  -1,254 2,035 781 
La Rioja	   -118 -23 -141  -2.11%  -388 -77 -464 
Ceuta y Melilla	   330 177 507  19.58%  2,327 1,250 3,577 
 España 0 0 0  0  0 0 0 












     
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
- Note: a negative relative balance means that the region pays more taxes per capita than the average or 
receives less expenditure. 
 
                                                
6 The most important items included in the section of financial operations are the contribution to the 
Social Security Reserve Fund, the granting of subsidized loans for research and other activities and the 
purchase of shares of certain public enterprises. 
 31 
Figure 2 shows the relationship between the relative net balance per capita of each region and 
its GDP per capita, with both variables measured in thousands of euros. Along with the 
scatter of points that represent the position of the different territories, we show the regression 
line that has been fitted to the subsample comprised by the common regime autonomous 
communities, excluding as atypical observations the Foral Communities and Ceuta and 
Melilla. This line describes what we may call the “normal” relationship between income per 
capita and aggregate regional relative balances. As may be expected, the fiscal balance tends 
to deteriorate as per capita income rises, so that richer territories generally display fiscal 
deficits and low income ones enjoy surpluses. Once again, the figure displays some 
surprising situations. The Foral Territories enjoy a fiscal surplus in spite of their high 
incomes, while Valencia displays a significant deficit with an income per capita below the 
national average and Murcia is practically in equilibrium in spite of its low level of income. 
 
Figure 2: Total relative per capita net balance vs. GDP per capita, 
thousands of euros, 2005 
 
- Key: An = Andalucía; Ar = Aragón; As = Asturias; Cana = Canarias; Cat = Cataluña; CyL = Castilla 
y León; CyMel = Ceuta y Melilla; Cnt = Cantabria; C-M = Castilla-La Mancha; Ex = Extremadura; Ga 
= Galicia; Ma = Madrid; Mu = Murcia; Na = Navarra; PV = País Vasco; Ri = Rioja; Va = Valencia. 
 
In the sections that follow we will examine in detail the regional distribution of the main 
components of public revenues and expenditure, seeking among other things to quantify the 
immediate sources of regional fiscal balances and to determine the origin of the apparent 
anomalies that have been detected in this preliminary analysis of aggregate expenditure and 
revenue patterns. Anticipating some of our key results, Table 13 shows the weights of certain 
key budgetary aggregates in regional fiscal balances. The first column shows the average 
value of these weights in the country as a whole7 and the remaining ones list the values that 
correspond to the regions with the largest positive and negative fiscal balances. 
 
                                                
7 To calculate these weights we work with the aggregate formed by all regions with positive fiscal 
relative balances –or equivalently, by all regions with negative relative balances. Since aggregate  
relative balances and each one of their components must add up to zero across regions, the sums of each 
of these items within each of these two territories is the same in absolute value, although different in 




Table 13: Weights of different budget items on regional fiscal balances 




average	   Cat	   Ma	   Ba	   Cana	   As	   Ex	  
Public revenues 73.70% 99.08% 82.62% 46.05% 120.61% 6.21% 73.51% 
Public expenditure 26.30% 0.92% 17.38% 53.95% -20.61% 93.79% 26.49% 
Regionalizable expenditure 19.23% 12.78% 10.70% 22.21% 14.31% 18.99% 12.44% 
  Regional financing* 15.33% 11.51% 11.82% 15.74% -0.86% -0.76% 5.57% 
   Infrastructure and transport 0.37% -0.29% -2.74% 6.50% -4.60% 6.60% 2.01% 
   Regional aid 6.31% 7.21% 4.91% 2.23% 8.29% 18.90% 9.36% 
   Other regionalizable expend. 0.32% 0.70% -0.98% -0.27% -0.48% -0.60% 0.48% 
Social protection 1.40% -12.40% 0.56% 20.79% -30.28% 63.37% -6.59% 
Economic regulation and promotion 6.78% 4.77% 5.66% 8.07% -4.41% -0.21% 16.15% 
Interests on the national debt 2.42% 0.70% 2.24% 6.63% 0.75% 9.47% 3.33% 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
- Note: A negative sign indicates that the partial balance has a different sign than the overall fiscal 
balance of the region. 
 (*) at homogeneous competences and equal fiscal effort 
 
The first column of the table tells us that, on average, almost three quarters of regional fiscal 
balances simply reflect the fact that the residents of richer territories pay more taxes per capita than 
those of lower income regions. The remaining quarter, which is the potentially worrisome part, 
comes from expenditure programs. Regional financing plays an important role in this area, 
with a weight of over 15%, along with regional aid programs and subsidies to certain 
productive sectors, especially agriculture. On the other hand, infrastructure investment and 
expenditure on transport generally plays a very minor role in regional fiscal balances, and so 
does expenditure in social protection.  
The remaining columns tell us that regions are very different from each other. In Asturias, for 
instance, revenues contribute almost nothing to the region’s fiscal surplus because its 
residents are almost on the national average in terms of the tax burden per capita. On the 
other hand, the region has a very large positive balance in the area of social protection that is 
due in part to its aged population and in part to the generosity of the early pensions that were 
negotiated during the restructuring of the region’s large publicly-held industrial and coal 
mining sectors. Also important in Asturias were regional aid programs that were also largely 
linked to the restructuring of the coal-mining sector. Canarias is Asturias’ mirror image. In 
spite of having a below average level of expenditure (largely due to low pension spending as 
a result of a very young population) the region enjoys a large fiscal surplus thanks primarily 
to a very low fiscal pressure as a result of a special fiscal regime characterized by very low 
indirect taxation. At the other end of the distribution, there are also very significant 
differences across regions. For instance, while Catalonia’s deficit arises almost exclusively on 





 6. The distribution of regionalizable expenditure 
In the year 2005, the total volume of what we have called regionalizable expenditure was of 
approximately 175 billion euros, or 53% of the public spending registered in the SRPA. 
Within regionalizable expenditure, the biggest item by far corresponded to the financing of 
the autonomous communities. Figure 3 shows indices of regionalizable expenditure and 
homogenized regional financing per capita, both calculated at equal fiscal effort. In the 
remainder of the section we will analyze in greater detail both aggregates and their main 
components.  
 
Figure 3: Aggregate index of regionalizable expenditure per capita at equal fiscal effort 
and of per capita regional financing at homogeneous competences and equal fiscal effort 
 
  
 6.1. Regional financing 
The financing of the regional administrations is one of the biggest expenditure items in the 
public budget. In 2005, the resources assigned to the financing of the core competences that 
have been assumed by all autonomous communities, calculated at equal fiscal effort, came to 
104 billion euros or 61% of regionalizable expenditure and 32% of total public spending 
(sections 1 to 5 of the SRPA). 
As we have already seen, this aggregate includes regional revenues from devolved taxes, 
homogenized so as to approximate the intake that would have been obtained in each region 
applying a common tax schedule in the entire country. In the case of the Foral Regions, from 
the intake of devolved taxes we subtract, in addition to the cupo or aportación (the transfer 
back to the Central Government that should cover these region’s share of central services) the 
estimated cost of those competences that only the Foral Regions have assumed, as well as 
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those corresponding to competences that in the rest of Spain are financed through earmarked 
grants from the Central Government. This is done to ensure that the regional financing data 
are directly comparable across all regions because they measure the resources that would 
have been available to each autonomous community in order to finance a homogeneous set of 
competences before making use of their autonomy in fiscal matters to raise or lower their tax 
revenues. 
 
Table 14: Regional financing at homogeneous competences, euros per capita 
_____________________________________________________________________ 



































Andalucía 2.234	   0	   -72	   2.162	   -2	   2.160	  
Aragón 2.467	   0	   -20	   2.447	   13	   2.460	  
Asturias 2.330	   0	   0	   2.330	   27	   2.357	  
Baleares 2.114	   0	   -35	   2.078	   47	   2.125	  
Canarias 2.426	   0	   -97	   2.329	   -36	   2.293	  
Cantabria 2.779	   0	   -144	   2.636	   -2	   2.634	  
Castilla y León 2.497	   0	   -4	   2.493	   4	   2.497	  
Cast.- Mancha 2.321	   0	   -5	   2.316	   8	   2.324	  
Cataluña 2.280	   0	   -128	   2.152	   66	   2.218	  
Valencia 2.066	   0	   -44	   2.021	   29	   2.051	  
Extremadura 2.522	   0	   0	   2.522	   20	   2.542	  
Galicia 2.383	   0	   -54	   2.329	   38	   2.367	  
Madrid 2.163	   0	   -142	   2.021	   32	   2.053	  
Murcia 2.129	   0	   -9	   2.120	   26	   2.146	  
Navarra 5.507	   -749	   -607	   4.152	   -648	   3.504	  
País Vasco 5.915	   -564	   -713	   4.638	   -636	   4.002	  
La Rioja 2.659	   0	   -144	   2.515	   -10	   2.505	  
Ceuta y Melilla 160	   0	   3.281	   3.441	   0	   3.441	  
España 2.484	   -37	   -102	   2.346	   -17	   2.329	  
       
 Common regime* 2.273	   0	   -75	   2.198	   24	   2.222	  
Foral regions 5.826	   -604	   -690	   4.531	   -639	   3.893	  
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
  - Note: (*) Does not include Ceuta and Melilla. 
 
Table 14 shows the most relevant magnitudes measured in euros per capita. The most 
striking feature of the table is the enormous difference that exists between the Foral regions 
and the rest of the autonomous communities. Since Foral regions collect all devolved taxes in 
their territories, their homogenized per capita tax revenues are mucho higher than those of 
the other territories (see column [1]). From this magnitude, however, we have to subtract 
certain transfers to the Central Government that do not exist in other regions (basically, the 
cupo and aportación, column [2]), and the cost of a series of competences that the rest of the 
regions have not assumed or are financed with earmarked Central Government grants 
(column [3]). Even so, the per capita financing of the Foral Regions at homogeneous 
competences and equal fiscal effort (column [4]) is approximately twice the size of the 
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financing of common-regime regions. Finally, fiscal pressure is also significantly lower in the 
Foral Regions which, unlike their common regime counterparts, display a negative and quite 
sizable supplementary fiscal effort (column [5]). Although such tax reductions lower the 
observed financing of Foral Regions, this is still over 75% above that of the average common-
regime region. 
Another atypical case is that of Ceuta and Melilla. Since these two North-African autonomous 
cities have not assumed responsibility over the provision of health care, education and social 
services, three competences that account for the bulk of the expenditure of autonomous 
communities, the per capita revenues they get from the regional financing system (a small 
grant from the Sufficiency Fund) are much lower than those obtained by the autonomous 
communities (see column [1]). On the other hand, when we take into account the direct 
expenditure of the Central Government on these services and the intake of the local indirect 
tax (IPSI) (column [3]), their level of financing per capita is among the highest (column [4]). It 
must be kept in mind, however, that this is due at least in part to the high expenditure needs 
that arise from the absence of economies of scale in the prevision of key services in two 
isolated territories with a small population. 
When it comes to evaluating the distribution of autonomous financing, it is important to keep 
in mind the differences in the cost of public services that exist among territories as a result of 
their demographic and geographic characteristics. To take into account these factors, the 
regional financing system uses a population variable that is adjusted for the estimated unit 
costs of the services managed by the autonomous communities in order to try to approximate 
the expenditure needs of regional governments. In what follows, we will work with indices of 
financing per adjusted capita constructed using this indicator. Unadjusted per capita figures 
will also be used in order to include Ceuta and Melilla in the picture, as we do not have the 
information that would be necessary to calculate the adjusted population of these cities. 
Table 15 and Figure 4 show indices of regional financing at homogeneous competences per 
capita and per adjusted capita, distinguishing between financing at equal fiscal effort and 
observed financing after regional governments have made use of their powers to raise or 
lower taxes. All indices take as a reference average financing per capita or per adjusted capita 
in the set of common regime autonomous communities, excluding Ceuta and Melilla and the 
Foral Regions. The adjusted population is calculated with the formula used in the current 
financing system (approved in 2009) and using the average values of adjusted population on 
January 1st 2005 and 2006 in order to approximate the average adjusted population during 
the year 2005.8  
Once again, the case of the Foral Communities is worth noting. They enjoy about twice as 
much financing per adjusted capita than the average common regime region when the 
calculation is made at equal fiscal effort. As for the common regime regions, the results are 
consistent with the widely known figures on regional financing that are published annually  
                                                
8 The data have been provided by the General Secretariat on Autonomic and Local Coordination and 
refer to the 17 autonomous communities, including the Foral Communities, but not Ceuta and Melilla. 
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Table 15: Indices of regional financing at homogeneous competences 




















Andalucía 98.4	   97.2	   100.0	   98.9	  
Aragón 111.3	   110.7	   105.6	   105.0	  
Asturias 106.0	   106.1	   103.1	   103.2	  
Baleares 94.5	   95.6	   94.0	   95.1	  
Canarias 105.9	   103.2	   102.2	   99.5	  
Cantabria 119.9	   118.5	   120.9	   119.5	  
Castilla y León 113.4	   112.4	   106.2	   105.2	  
Cast. - La Mancha 105.4	   104.6	   98.1	   97.4	  
Cataluña 97.9	   99.8	   99.8	   101.7	  
Valencia 91.9	   92.3	   94.4	   94.7	  
Extremadura 114.7	   114.4	   107.8	   107.5	  
Galicia 106.0	   106.5	   100.8	   101.4	  
Madrid 91.9	   92.4	   98.8	   99.3	  
Murcia 96.5	   96.6	   98.9	   99.0	  
Navarra 188.9	   157.7	   185.2	   154.7	  
País Vasco 211.0	   180.1	   215.2	   183.7	  
La Rioja 114.4	   112.7	   113.6	   112.0	  
Ceuta y Melilla 156.5	   154.8	   	   	  
 	   	   	   	  Spain 106.7	   104.8	   107.1	   105.2	  
Common regime w/o Ceuta 
and Melilla 100.0	   100.0	   100.0	   100.0	  
Foral communities 206.1	   175.2	   208.4	   177.1	  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Figure 4: Regional financing per adjusted capita at homogeneous competences 
common-regime territories except for Ceuta and Melilla = 100 
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and do not change significantly when we use figures on observed financing rather than those 
calculated at equal fiscal effort.9 
To quantify the impact that the uneven distribution of regional financing can have on 
regional fiscal balances, these balances are compared in Table 16 with the excess financing of 
each autonomous community. This magnitude is defined as the difference between each 
region’s actual financing (at homogeneous competences and equal fiscal effort) and the 
amount that would have corresponded to it (under the same conditions) if all of them had 
received the same financing per adjusted capita, keeping constant the observed level of total 
regional financing. Ceuta and Melilla (but not the Foral Regions) are excluded from the 
calculation because we have no data on their adjusted population. 
 
Table 16: Excess regional financing vs. relative regional fiscal balances 










Andalucía -1,181 7,902 -14.9% 
Aragón -41 484 -8.5% 
Asturias -93 2,199 -4.2% 
Baleares -284 -1,684 16.9% 
Canarias -215 3,844 -5.6% 
Cantabria 172 467 36.9% 
Castilla y León -43 4,095 -1.1% 
Cast. - La Mancha -398 3,654 -10.9% 
Cataluña -1,097 -11,887 9.2% 
Valencia -1,278 -2,881 44.4% 
Extremadura 21 3,445 0.6% 
Galicia -392 4,034 -9.7% 
Madrid -997 -16,433 6.1% 
Murcia -234 553 -42.3% 
Navarra 1,049 180 582.5% 
País Vasco 4,966 1,664 298.5% 
La Rioja 45 -141 -31.8% 





The last column of the Table shows the ratio between the two magnitudes shown in the 
previous two columns. This ratio is negative when excess financing and the region’s relative 
fiscal balance have different signs, as it happens for instance in the case of Andalucía, which 
displays a positive aggregate relative balance and a below average level of financing per 
adjusted capita. The fact that this situation arises quite frequently reminds us that there is no 
systematic relationship between regional financing and aggregate fiscal balances. There are, 
                                                
9 The main differences between the data used here and the more standard ones based on the annual 
reports on the results of the regional financing system is that the latter include the normative or 
theoretical intake of regional government user charges and refer to the “definitive” or accrued regional 
financing for each year, rather than to observed financing calculated on a cash basis, as is the case here. 
These factors have a very small impact on relative financing per capita or per adjusted capita. 
 38 
however, some instances in which regional disparities in financing per adjusted capita 
explain a significant fraction of fiscal balances that can be considered anomalous. In the case 
of Valencia, for instance, raising the region’s financing per adjusted capita to the national 
average would suffice to eliminate almost half of its fiscal deficit. In Baleares, Catalonia and 
Madrid, this ratio would be between 6% and 17%. In the two Foral Communities, bringing 
financing per adjusted capita down to the national average would more than eliminate their 
surprising fiscal surplus, bringing both the Basque Country and Navarre much closer to the 
fiscal position of other high-income regions. 
 
 6.2. Infrastructures and transport 
In spite of its low weight in the public budget (4.5% of the expenditure included in the 2005 
SRPA), the distribution of public spending on infrastructure and transport generally attracts a 
disproportionate amount of attention, as well as the unanimous complaints of the 
autonomous communities, all of whom feel mistreated on this account. This is, moreover, an 
area in which reasonable valuations of the distribution of expenditure can only be made on 
the basis of averages over relatively long periods for the lumpy character of large 
infrastructure projects implies that expenditure will tend to concentrate each year on a 
handful of regions that will vary over time. And even when we work with such averages, the 
results must be analyzed taking into account the effect on unit construction costs and on the 
demand for transport services of such things as the nature of the terrain, the dispersion of the 
population settlement pattern or the needs for merchandise transport. In this case, therefore, 
equality in spending per capita need not be desirable, even in the medium or long run. 
 
Figure 5: Per capita expenditure on infrastructure and transport, 
national average = 100 
 
Figure 5 summarizes the situation in 2005. As expected, there are large differences across 
regions in per capita spending, with Rioja at one end of the distribution (with an index of 49) 
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and Castilla la Mancha in the other (with 214). Around half of the spending in this last region, 
however, comes from the construction of a single segment of toll highway. 
 
 6.3. Regional aid 
The Spanish Central Government and the European Union (EU) spent in 2005 around 6.3 
billion euros in regional aid programs that concentrated on a handful of territories. Figure 6 
shows two indicators of the volume of aid per capita in the Spanish regions. The thinner line 
corresponds to EU grants that go directly to the regions rather than through the General 
Central Budget (with the exception of the agricultural subsidies that are included in the 
section on economic regulation further on). To go from this line to the thicker black line, we 
incorporate the rest of the items included in this section to arrive at total expenditure on 
regional aid programs. 
 
Figure 6: Regional aid per capita, 
national average = 100 
 
  - Note: Regions arranged by increasing GDP per capita. 
 
As expected, EU grants tend to fall as income rises. In terms of the graph, the introduction of 
national programs generates a clear “peak” in Asturias, which corresponds to subsidies to the 
coal mining sector, and smaller peaks in Andalucía and Extremadura (as a result of a special 
unemployment benefit for agricultural workers in both regions), Castilla y León (also coal 
mining) and the island regions of Baleares and Canarias and Ceuta y Melilla (mostly because 
of transport subsidies to residents and merchandises). The subsidy going to the three regions 
most favored by these programs was over 300 euros per capita and reached 531 euros in the 





7. Expenditure on social protection 
Expenditure on social protection in 2005 amounted to 105 billion euros, almost a third of the 
total volume of spending registered in the SRPA. The bulk of this expenditure corresponds to 
contributive pension benefits, followed in importance by unemployment benefit payments. 
 
Figure 7: Per capita expenditure on social protection 
national average = 100 
  
- Note: regions arranged by ingreasing GDP per capita. Contributive pensions include those of civil 
servants (“clases pasivas”). 
 
Table 17: Per capita expenditure on social protection 














Andalucía 85.2 98.3 96.7 98.4 88.2 
Aragón 117.7 77.7 100.7 98.1 110.9 
Asturias 169.3 104.3 107.2 101.5 154.1 
Baleares 78.7 134.0 87.5 79.5 85.2 
Canarias 64.3 124.8 83.1 103.1 75.4 
Cantabria 121.8 89.0 96.6 101.6 115.7 
Castilla y León 120.6 80.8 114.5 106.4 114.5 
Cast. - La Mancha 84.7 80.8 108.1 97.9 85.9 
Cataluña 109.6 113.7 96.8 97.7 108.7 
Valencia 83.9 96.6 90.5 99.0 87.0 
Extremadura 87.8 101.6 120.5 101.7 91.2 
Galicia 114.7 102.3 110.9 112.6 113.0 
Madrid 99.5 98.8 93.3 99.6 99.4 
Murcia 79.8 79.5 128.5 98.2 82.2 
Navarra 108.0 98.8 92.1 95.9 105.5 
País Vasco 140.1 99.2 87.5 103.5 131.0 
La Rioja 102.0 82.7 135.0 80.9 98.0 
Ceuta y Melilla 78.9 94.6 458.6 135.1 91.1 
national aerage 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 




Figure 7 shows two indices of per capita expenditure on social protection. The thinner red 
line corresponds to contributive Social Security benefits (mostly pensions) and civil servants’ 
pensions while the thicker black line describes total expenditure on social protection. In 
general terms, per capita pension expenditure tends to rise with income per capita (through 
higher contributions) and is very sensitive to the degree of aging of the population. To this 
we have to add in the case of Asturias the generosity of the early retirement schemes that 
were established for the mining and industrial sectors during the process of restructuring that 
the region has undergone during the last few decades. 
Table 17 shows a partial breakdown of social spending. In general, neither pensions nor other 
contributive benefits, which account for the bulk of this expenditure heading, are particularly 
redistributive at the regional level because benefit levels are linked to contributions that rise 
with wages. On the other hand, expenditure on social services seems to be more sensitive to 
aging than to income per capita. 
 
8. Economic regulation and employment promotion  
As can be seen in Figure 8, the distribution of expenditure on economic regulation and 
employment promotion is dominated by the allocation of agricultural subsidies, which come 
mostly form the Common Agricultural Policy of the EU and concentrate on those regions 
with the greater output of certain agricultural products. On the other hand, spending on 
employment promotion is distributed much more evenly across territories. The rest of the 
programs included in this section channel a much smaller amount of resources than these 
two items and have little impact on the final distribution of expenditure. 
 
Figure 8: Per capita expenditure on economic regulation and employment promotion 
national average = 100 
 
 - Note: regions arranged byincreasing GDP per cápita.  
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 9. The distribution of public revenues 
Figure 9 shows the fiscal burden per capita borne by the residents of the different Spanish 
regions, distinguishing between the intake of Central and Regional taxes that amount for the 
bulk of the revenues of the Spanish public administrations and the total revenues registered 
in the SRPA, which also includes municipal taxes and user charges and certain minor revenue 
items of the Central Administration (including user charges, public prices, and financial and 
property income). As expected, the fiscal burden tends to rise in absolute terms with 
disposable income, a fact that is the main immediate source of regional fiscal balances, both 
positive and negative. There are, however, some noteworthy exceptions to this rule in the 
territories that enjoy special fiscal regimes (Canarias, Ceuta and Melilla and the two Foral 
Regions, Na and PV in the figure). 
 
Figure 9: Per capita fiscal burden, national average = 100 
 
- Note: regions arranged by increasing per capita disposable income 
 
Figure 10: Per capita tax revenue of the Central and Regional Administrations 
observed intake vs. intake at equal fiscal effort, national average = 100 
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Focusing now on the tax revenues of the Central and Regional Administrations, Figure 10 
compares the total per capita tax burden with the one that would have existed if all regions 
had applied a common tax schedule. In this manner, we isolate the impact of the lower taxes 
enjoyed by the residents of Canarias and Ceuta and Melilla and the results of the use made by 
the regions of their powers to lower or raise taxes. This last effect is rather small except in the 
case of the Foral Regions, while those of the special fiscal regimes of the first two territories 
are quite important. Taken as a whole, the tax reductions in force contributed 2.300 million 
euros (1.160 euros per capita) to Canarias’ fiscal surplus, 120 million (840 euros per capita) to 
that of Ceuta and Melilla and 1.230 million to the relative fiscal balance of the Foral Regions 
(around 450 euros per capita). 
  
 10. What part of regional fiscal balances should worry us? 
As we have already argued in the introduction, an important objective of the SRPA is helping 
us isolate the part of the regional fiscal balances that may be considered potentially 
worrisome because it may reflect differences in the treatment of groups of citizens with the 
same rights and similar needs. On the basis of the above discussion, we should exclude from 
this category all expenditure on public goods and services of national scope that affect all 
citizens in the same way, as well as all spending on social protection and economic 
regulation. It also seems logical to exclude all those taxes that are paid according to a uniform 
schedule in the entire country. This does not mean that there are no questionable features in 
these programs but, to the extent that the criteria that determine the allocation of their 
resources respond to an individual or a sectorial logic that is applied uniformly in the entire 
country, their design does not in principle raise any territorial equity problems, which is what 
concerns us here. 
This leaves us with two groups of programs whose costs and benefits are indeed distributed 
with a territorial logic. In connection with the majority of these programs (although certainly 
not in all of them) equal per capita treatment seems to be a reasonable fairness reference and 
deviations from it would require at least a reasoned justification. The first of these groups of 
programs is what we have called regionalizable expenditure in a strict sense, that is, regional 
and local financing, infrastructure investment and spending on transport, regional aid 
programs and expenditure on local or collective services such as health care, education and 
public security. The second group has to do with the existence of privileged fiscal regimes 
that allow certain territories to enjoy substantial tax reductions that, for our purposes, should 
be considered regional aid programs.10 
The sum of the partial fiscal balances generated by these two groups of programs gives us an 
upper bound for the size of the equity problems we may be facing in connection with the 
distribution of public resources and tax burdens. What this variable measures is the 
magnitude of the deviation from equal treatment per capita that arises in connection with 
                                                
10 This leaves out the interest on the national debt, but since this expenditure is imputed in proportion 
to the rest of expenditure, it does not make sense to discuss its allocation independently. To the extent 
that any questionable features in the allocation of other expenditure items are corrected, the same will 
be true with the corresponding interests.  
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that part of the public budget that is allocated with a territorial criterion. Certainly, there will 
be instances when deviating from per capita equality will be perfectly reasonable, but it 
seems prudent to require two things of such deviations. First, that they should be transparent. 
And second, that they should be evaluated periodically to see if they are justified, keeping in 
mind that what is given to some must be paid by others. 
 
Table 18: Potentially problematic components of regional relative fiscal balances 
	  
Total relative balance, millions 





effort	   total	   % of GDP	  
euros per 
capita	  
Andalucía -1,892 -528 -2,420 -1.9% -306 
Aragón 475 -100 376 1.3% 295 
Asturias 465 -97 368 1.9% 342 
Baleares -311 -112 -422 -1.9% -426 
Canarias 512 2,293 2,805 7.7% 1,415 
Cantabria 358 -36 323 2.8% 571 
Castilla y León 857 -178 679 1.4% 270 
Cast. – La Mancha 562 -144 417 1.4% 218 
Cataluña -934 -899 -1,833 -1.1% -259 
Valencia -2,461 -454 -2,915 -3.3% -614 
Extremadura 469 -96 372 2.4% 343 
Galicia -339 -284 -624 -1.3% -226 
Madrid -1,465 -567 -2,032 -1.3% -339 
Murcia -252 -128 -379 -1.6% -280 
Navarra 602 282 883 5.7% 1,478 
País Vasco 3,163 945 4,108 7.3% 1,930 
La Rioja -17 -17 -33 -0.5% -109 
Ceuta y Melilla 208 119 327 12.6% 2,307 
total 0 0 0 0.0% 0 
Sum of positives* 7,671 3,639 11,310 1.25% 255 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
- Note: (*) sum of positives is the sum of the positive balances for each concept (which is the same as the 
sum of the negative balances, with a changed sign). This variable measures the volume of the total 
redistributive fiscal flows across regions generated by each group of programs. 
 
The relevant figures are shown in Table 18. Looking at the table’s last row, we see that we are 
talking about 11.3 billion euros, or 1.25% of Spanish GDP, that is distributed across regions in 
a way that may be potentially questionable. The most relevant items are the following. The 
low fiscal pressure that is enjoyed by residents in territories with special fiscal regimes 
(Canarias, Ceuta and Melilla and the Foral Regions) amounts to an implicit subsidy of around 
3.6 billion euros that is paid by all other regions. On the other hand, approximately half of the 
“excess” regionalizable expenditure also concentrates on the Foral Regions, mostly thanks to 
a level of regional financing way above that of the rest of the country. The other half is 
allocated unevenly across territories, leaving the Mediterranean coastal regions and Madrid 
with a clear deficit. Adding up both items and dividing by population, we see that the 
regions that were worse off in 2005 were Valencia and Baleares, with per capita deficits of 614 
and 426 euros respectively, followed by Madrid (-339), Andalucía (-306), Murcia (-290) and 
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Catalonia (-259), while the most favored regions were Ceuta and Melilla (+2.307), País Vasco 
(+1.930), Navarra (+1.478) and Canarias (+1.415).  
For reasons already noted, it would be imprudent to try to extract directly form Table 18 a 
detailed set of recommendations regarding the optimal allocation of certain components of 
the public budget. Before going that far, we would have to evaluate very carefully the 
arguments in favor of regional development programs aimed at the poorer territories and the 
problems and specific features of certain regions that may justify special treatment in the 
form of higher levels of expenditure or lower levels of taxation, including higher costs in the 
provision of certain public services and the possible existence of locational disadvantages. But 
the analysis we have carried out in previous sections does suggest that, in general terms, the 
Table does indeed point us in the correct direction: greater equality in the distribution of 
regionalizable expenditure would certainly be desirable from an equity point of view. A good 
place to start would be with a reform in this direction of the regional and local financing 
systems, with special attention to the foral case. Another thing that would not hurt would be 
a critical evaluation of existing regional aid programs, both on the expenditure and on the 
revenue side, in order to determine whether such programs are achieving their objectives and 
doing so at a reasonable cost. 
 
 11. Conclusion 
In this paper we have developed a methodology for the construction of a System of 
Regionalized Public Accounts (SRPA) following a burden-benefit approach and have applied 
this methodology to the case of 2005. This new statistical tool can be used to compute the net 
fiscal balances of the Spanish regions but it also allows a much richer analysis of the 
territorial incidence of the public sector for at least two reasons. First, because the SRPA 
provides detailed information on the sources of aggregate regional fiscal balances that allows 
us to isolate the contributions to such balances of different groups of programs that should be 
evaluated with different criteria depending among other things on the relation they bear to 
the territory. And second, because the new statistic neutralizes the effects of the many 
asymmetries that characterize our model of territorial organization so as to allow valid 
comparisons across regions in terms of a great variety of homogeneous budget aggregates. 
One such aggregate that can be particularly interesting is the volume of regional financing at 
equal competences and fiscal effort. 
A central result of the analysis that can surely be extrapolated to more recent years than the 
one analyzed here is that what we can call the potentially worrisome component of regional 
fiscal balances is rather small. Almost three quarters of such balances simply reflect the fact 
that more taxes per capita are paid in richer regions than in poorer ones. The remaining 
quarter comes from the distribution of public expenditure and it is in this area that we have 
found indications of worrisome things, although of a manageable scale. 
The problems are concentrated in what we have called regionalizable expenditure in a strict 
sense, i.e. in those programs that finance services or benefits to which citizens have access 
depending on their place of residence. Within this area, we have documented the existence of 
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differences across regions in things such as regional financing that seem unreasonably large 
and difficult to justify. We have also seen that a significant amount of resources are devoted 
to various regional aid programs (among which we should include the special tax regimes 
that exist in certain territories) whose effectiveness should be evaluated, taking into account 
the relevant costs. On the other hand, expenditure on infrastructure and transport has not 
played a significant role in the generation of regional fiscal balances – a rather unsurprising 
result, given the small weight of this item in overall public spending. 
The aggregate volume of the partial fiscal balances generated by those programs whose 
distribution is potentially questionable from an equity point of view is around 11.4 billion 
euros or 1.25% of Spanish GDP. Over half of this figure arises from the uneven distribution of 
regional financing. Hence, a reform of the regional financing system oriented towards greater 
equality could mitigate very significantly the equity problems we have documented in this 
paper, especially if it succeeds in starting to reduce the very large differences in financing per 





Agencia Tributaria (AT, 2006). Informe anual de recaudación tributaria. Año 2005. Madrid. 
 http://www.agenciatributaria.es/AEAT.internet/datosabiertos/catalogo/hacienda/Info
rmes_anuales_de_Recaudacion_Tributaria.shtml 
Barberán, R. (2006). "Los estudios sobre balanzas fiscales regionales en España (1960-2005)." 
Presupuesto y Gasto Público 43, pp. 63-94. 
C-Interreg (2013). Estadísticas de Flujos de Comercio Interregional de mercancías en España. 
 http://87.106.254.62/explotacion_multidimensional_comercio_interregional/estadisticas.
aspx 
Castells, A., R. Barberán, N. Bosch, M. Espasa, F. Rodrigo and J. Ruiz-Huerta (2000). Las 
balanzas fiscales de las Comunidades Autónomas (1991-1996). Ariel Economía, Barcelona. 
Colegio de Registradores de la Propiedad, Bienes Inmuebles y Mercantiles de España. (CRP, 
2006). Estadística Registral Inmobiliaria. Anuario 2005. 
 http://www.registradores.org/ERI_ANUAL.jsp 




de la Fuente, A. (2000). "Un poco de aritmética territorial: anatomía de una balanza fiscal para 
las regiones españolas." Mimeo, Instituto de Análisis Económico, CSIC. 
de la Fuente, A., R. Barberán and E. Uriel (DBU, 2014a). “Un sistema de cuentas públicas 
territorializadas para España: Metodología y resultados para 2005. Anexos.” Mimeo, 
FEDEA. 
de la Fuente, A., R. Barberán and E. Uriel (DBU, 2014b). “Un sistema de cuentas públicas 
territorializadas para España: Metodología y resultados para 2011.” Mimeo, FEDEA. 
 http://documentos.fedea.net/pubs/eee/eee2014-03.pdf 
Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Comisión de expertos sobre metodología para la elaboración de 
las balanzas fiscales de las regiones españolas (IEF, 2006). Informe sobre metodología de 
cálculo de las balanzas fiscales. Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda, Madrid. 
Instituto de Estudios Fiscales (IEF, 2008). Las balanzas fiscales de las CC.AA. españolas con 
las AA. Públicas Centrales, 2005. Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda, Madrid. 
Instituto de Estudios Turísticos (IET, 2006a). Movimientos turísticos de los españoles, 
FAMILITUR. Año 2005.  
 http://www.iet.tourspain.es/es-es/estadisticas/familitur/paginas/default.aspx 
Instituto de Estudios Turísticos (IET, 2006b). EGATUR, Encuesta de Gasto Turístico, 2005. 
 http://www.iet.tourspain.es/es-es/estadisticas/egatur/paginas/default.aspx 
Instituto de Estudios Turísticos (IET, 2006c). FRONTUR, Movimientos turísticos en fronteras, 
2005.  
 http://www.iet.tourspain.es/es-ES/estadisticas/frontur/Paginas/default.aspx 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE, 2013a). Cifras oficiales de población de los municipios 
españoles. Revisión del padrón de población.  
 http://www.ine.es/inebmenu/mnu_padron.htm 
 48 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE, 2013b). Contabilidad Regional de España. Base 2000. 
http://www.ine.es/jaxi/menu.do?type=pcaxis&path=%2Ft35%2Fp010&file=inebase&L=
0 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE, 2013c). Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares 
http://www.ine.es/jaxi/menu.do?type=pcaxis&path=%2Ft25/e437&file=inebase&L=0 
Intervención General de la Comunidad Autónoma de Canarias (IGCAC, 2006?). Cuenta 
General de la Comunidad Autónoma de Canarias. Año 2005. Libro divulgativo. 
 http://www2.gobiernodecanarias.org/hacienda/intervencion/cuenta_general/libro2005.
jsp 
Intervención General de la Administración del Estado (IGAE, 2006). Presupuestos Generales 
del Estado. Liquidación del Presupuesto de 2005. Volúmenes I (Estado) y II (Organismos). 




Intervención General de la Seguridad Social (IGSS, 2013). Liquidación del Presupuesto de la 




Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (MEC, 2013). Datacomex, estadísticas del comercio 
exterior 
 http://datacomex.comercio.es/principal_comex_es.aspx 
Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda (MEH, 2005). "Financiación de las comunidades 
autónomas por los impuestos cedidos, fondo de suficiencia y garantía de financiación de 
los servicios de asistencia sanitaria correspondiente al ejercicio 2003 y liquidación 




Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda (MEH, 2007a). "Financiación de las comunidades 
autónomas por los impuestos cedidos, fondo de suficiencia y garantía de financiación de 
los servicios de asistencia sanitaria correspondiente al ejercicio 2005 y liquidación 




Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda (MEH, 2007b). Financiación de los municipios de más de 
75.000 habitantes, capitales de provincia o de comunidad autónoma; y de las provincias y 
entes asimilados correspondiente al ejercicio 2005. Dirección General de Coordinación 




Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda (MEH, 2007c). Financiación de los municipios de menos 
de 75.000 habitantes, excluidas capitales de provincia o de comunidad autónoma 
correspondiente al ejercicio 2005. Dirección General de Coordinación Financiera con las 






Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda (MEH, 2008a). Las Haciendas autonómicas en cifras 2005. 




Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda (MEH, 2008b). Haciendas locales en cifras, año 2005. 








Ministerio de Fomento (MF, 2013). Estadística de Transacciones Inmobiliarias. En sitio web 
del Ministerio de Fomento: Estadísticas y Publicaciones: Información Estadística: Vivienda 
y actuaciones urbanas: Estadísticas: Transacciones Inmobiliarias. 
 http://www.fomento.gob.es/BE2/?nivel=2&orden=34000000 
Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones Públicas (MHAP, 2012a). Recaudación y 
estadísticas del sistema tributario español, 2000-2010. Anexo: Series históricas de la 
recaudación tributaria del Estado y Comunidades Autónomas. Dirección General de 
Tributos, Madrid. En sitio web del Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones Públicas: 




Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones Públicas (MHAP, 2013a). Liquidación de los 
presupuestos de las comunidades autónomas. Secretaría General de Coordinación 
Autonómica y Local, Madrid. 
 http://serviciosweb.meh.es/apps/publicacionliquidacion/aspx/menuInicio.aspx 
Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones Públicas (MHAP, 2013b). Liquidación de los 
presupuestos de las entidades locales. Secretaría General de Coordinación Autonómica y 
Local, Madrid. 
 http://serviciosweb.meh.es/apps/entidadeslocales/ 
Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales (MTAS, 2007). Resumen de la Cuenta General de la 




Uriel, E. and R. Barberán (2007). Las balanzas fiscales de las comunidades autónomas con la 
Administración Pública Central (1991-2005). Fundación BBVA, Bilbao. 
 
 
 
